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1959 
Federal Magistrate Court of Appeals: 
Whether Magistrate Judge 
Disposition of Section 2255 Motions 
Under Consent Jurisdiction Is 
Statutorily and Constitutionally 
Permissible 
Corey J. Hauser* 
Abstract 
For decades the Supreme Court has balanced the tension 
between judicial efficiency and adherence to our constitutional 
system of separation of powers. As more cases were filed in 
federal courts, Congress increased the responsibilities and power 
given to magistrate judges. The result is magistrate judges 
wielding as much power as district judges. With post-conviction 
relief under § 2255, magistrate judges take on a whole new 
role— appellate judge—reviewing and potentially overturning 
sentences imposed by district judges. 
This practice raises two concerns. First, did Congress intend 
to statutorily give magistrate judges this power? The prevailing 
interpretation is that § 2255 motions are civil, not criminal, 
proceedings able to be disposed of by magistrates. Still, at least 
one circuit court has disagreed, holding that § 2255 motions are 
criminal proceedings, incapable of magistrate disposition. 
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Law. Thank you to Professor Joan M. Shaughnessy for all of her advice and 
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Second, even if magistrate judges have statutory jurisdiction to 
decide § 2255 motions, does the practice violate separation of 
powers? When magistrate judges determine the validity of 
district judge-imposed sentences, non-Article III judges are given 
final say on whether an Article III judge sentenced an individual 
correctly. 
This Note argues magistrate judge disposition of § 2255 
motions is statutorily and constitutionally impermissible. It 
recommends that Congress limit magistrate judge power in 
§ 2255 motions to issuing reports and recommendations, 
reviewed by district court judges. This recommendation achieves 
the twin aims of judicial efficiency and constitutionality, 
protecting the Judiciary, and the People, from intra-branch 
encroachment.  
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I.  Introduction 
That inflexibility and uniform adherence to the rights of the 
Constitution, and of individuals, which we perceive to be 
indispensable in the courts of justice, can certainly not be 
expected from judges who hold their offices by a temporary 
commission. Periodical appointments, however regulated, or 
by whomsoever made, would, in some way or other, be fatal 
to their necessary independence.1 
This quote, from Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist No. 78, 
explains the independence Article III judges must have to 
ensure fairness and impartiality for litigants. Built into Article 
III of the Constitution are certain protections—independence 
among the three branches of government, life tenure, and the 
inability for Congress to diminish the salary of judges.2 At the 
same time, our crowded judicial system depends on many 
non-Article III adjuncts to promote efficiency. As Justice 
Sotomayor said, “it is no exaggeration to say that without the 
distinguished service of these judicial colleagues, the work of the 
federal court system would grind nearly to a halt.”3  
Magistrate judges have become an important part of the 
federal judiciary. Since their inception, Congress and the courts 
have continued to expand magistrate judge power. Most 
 
 1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 572 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke 
ed., 1961). 
 2. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 3. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1938–39 
(2015). 
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expansions provide, however, that district courts must “check” 
magistrate judge power. For example, magistrate judges may 
decide dispositive motions in civil cases.4 But the district court 
must review and adopt that recommendation before it is binding 
on the litigants5—ensuring that a district judge, with the 
protections of Article III, enters final judgment in the case.  
Consent jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) does away 
with those protections.6 Section 636(c) allows magistrate judges 
to adjudicate any jury or nonjury “civil matter” so long as the 
parties consent.7 This means that a magistrate judge may enter 
final judgment in a case without review by a district judge.8 
While this system is facially troubling, in the context of habeas 
corpus petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, it is inapposite of 
statutory and constitutional principles. 
Section 2255 allows a prisoner to move for a sentencing 
reduction in the district that sentenced him—even though he 
can no longer appeal to a circuit court.9 These motions require 
the reviewing judge (the one adjudicating the motion) to decide 
whether the sentencing judge (typically the trial judge in the 
case) was correct in her determination. When magistrate judges 
adjudicate these motions, a non-Article III adjunct is put in the 
awkward position of determining whether a district judge was 
correct in her sentence. And because consent jurisdiction 
permits the magistrate judge to enter final judgment, the 
district judge has no ability to review the magistrate’s decision. 
That system turns the relationship between magistrate and 
district judges on its head because district judges appoint and 
 
 4. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). 
 5. Id. § 636(b)(1)(C). 
 6. See id. § 636(c)(1) (codifying “consent jurisdiction” for magistrate 
judges). 
 7. See id. (establishing that the court may remedy a violation by 
vacating, setting aside, or correcting the movant’s sentence).  
 8. See id. (permitting magistrate judges, once consent is obtained, to 
“order the entry of judgment”); § 636(c)(3) (stating that an aggrieved party 
may only take appeal “to the appropriate United States court of appeals from 
the judgment of the magistrate judge”).  
 9. See id. § 2255 (allowing movants to collaterally attack criminal 
proceedings).  
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supervise magistrate judges.10 Put plainly, a magistrate judge 
reviewing a § 2255 motion is like you giving your boss a 
quarterly review, instead of your boss giving you one.  
This practice raises two concerns vis à vis § 2255 motions. 
First, as a matter of statutory interpretation, is a § 2255 motion 
a “civil matter” capable of adjudication by a magistrate judge 
under § 636(c)? Second, supposing § 2255 motions fall within 
the jurisdictional language of § 636(c), does a magistrate judge 
reviewing and vacating a district judge’s earlier sentence violate 
principles of separation of powers?  
A circuit split currently exists as to whether § 2255 motions 
fall within a magistrate judge’s jurisdiction under § 636(c).11 
While § 2255 is technically separate from traditional habeas 
corpus relief,12 it shares many of the same characteristics of a 
habeas proceeding.13 Habeas corpus is a petition used to bring a 
person before a court to determine the legality of that person’s 
confinement.14 Because of the similarities between § 2255 and 
traditional habeas corpus, some courts have concluded § 2255 
motions, like habeas petitions, are civil proceedings.15 Other 
courts have taken the opposite position, classifying § 2255 
motions as criminal proceedings.16 This classification is 
important because magistrate judges can only adjudicate “civil 
 
 10. See 28 U.S.C. § 631 (describing the appointment, qualifications, and 
tenure of magistrate judges). 
 11. Compare United States v. Johnston, 258 F.3d 361, 366 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(holding that § 2255 motions fall within § 636(c) jurisdiction), and United 
States v. Bryson, 981 F.2d 720, 723 (4th Cir. 1992) (concluding that magistrate 
judges may adjudicate § 2255 motions where the criminal case was a 
misdemeanor), with Brown v. United States, 748 F.3d 1045, 1068 (11th Cir. 
2014) (avoiding the constitutional issue and ruling § 2255 proceedings are not 
civil matters for purposes of § 636(c)(1)). 
 12. See Ira P. Robbins, Magistrate Judges, Article III, and the Power to 
Preside over Federal Prisoner Section 2255 Proceedings, 2002 FED. CTS. L. REV. 
2, V.A.1 (“Although similar in purpose, § 2254 and § 2255 have distinguishing 
features . . . .”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (codifying general habeas corpus 
relief); id. § 2254 (permitting collateral attack of state court-imposed 
sentences that violate the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States). 
 13. See Robbins, supra note 12, at V.A.3 (“§ 2255 is analogous to § 2254.”). 
 14. Habeas Corpus, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).  
 15. See infra notes 141–146 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra notes 156–160 and accompanying text.  
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matter[s]” under § 636(c).17 Courts also look to the text and 
legislative history of § 636(c), to determine whether the drafters 
intended “civil matter” to include habeas and § 2255 motions.18  
Assuming § 2255 motions fall within magistrate judges’ 
statutory jurisdiction, the practice still raises Article III 
separation of powers concerns.19 Separation of powers ensures 
that (1) individuals have their cases heard by a judge free from 
the control of another branch of government and (2) the 
essential attributes of judicial power remain with Article III 
judges.20 When a magistrate judge adjudicates a § 2255 motion, 
she sits as a quasi-appellate judge, reviewing and potentially 
overturning a decision made by a district judge.21 This situation 
turns reviewability22 on its head and divests the district courts 
of Article III power, causing some courts to rule the practice 
unconstitutional.23  
Recently, however, the Supreme Court decided that party 
consent can go a long way to diminish, if not cure, separation of 
powers concerns.24 If litigant consent cures, magistrate judges 
can continue adjudicating § 2255 motions under § 636(c) so long 
as both parties consent. But if consent cannot diminish or cure 
this violation, then the practice violates separation of powers 
 
 17. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 18. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (“[A] United States magistrate 
judge . . . may conduct any and all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter 
and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 19. See United States v. Johnston, 258 F.3d 361, 367 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(raising the constitutional issue). 
 20. See id. (explaining why the doctrine of separation of powers applies 
to the judicial branch). 
 21. See infra notes 309–310 and accompanying text.  
 22. Reviewability is the idea that magistrate judge determinations are 
subject to “district court review and control.” Johnston, 258 F.3d at 371; see 
§ 636(b)(1)(C) (giving district courts de novo review of reports and 
recommendations prepared by magistrate judges); § 636(c)(4) (permitting 
district courts to vacate civil matter references to magistrate judges for good 
cause).  
 23. See Johnston, 258 F.3d at 372 (holding that consensual reference of a 
§ 2255 motion to a magistrate judge violates the doctrine of separation of 
powers).  
 24. See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1946 n.10 
(2015) (concluding that a bankruptcy judge may dispose of a state law claim if 
all parties consent). 
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and district courts must change the way magistrate judges 
participate in § 2255 proceedings.  
Part II of this Note provides background on magistrate 
judges and habeas corpus relief under § 2255. Part III 
introduces the circuit split over whether § 2255 motions are 
“civil matters” under § 636(c) jurisdiction. Part III then 
classifies § 2255 motions as either criminal, civil, or a hybrid 
proceeding, and determines whether they are a “civil matter” 
under § 636(c). Part IV analyzes the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence on Article III separation of powers, including its 
most recent decision in Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. 
Sharif.25 Part IV also discusses three lower court cases which 
have addressed whether magistrate judges may constitutionally 
adjudicate § 2255 motions. Part IV then provides a framework 
for determining whether litigant consent can cure any 
separation of powers concerns. Finally, this Note concludes by 
recommending that Congress limit magistrate judges to issuing 
reports and recommendations reviewed by a district judge on 
§ 2255 motions.26  
II.  Overview of the Magistrate Judge System and § 2255 
Proceedings 
Magistrate judges trace their roots to the United States 
Commissioner System of the late eighteenth century.27 The 
qualifications and duties of magistrate judges have changed 
much since this early system.28 This Part discusses the history 
of magistrate judge statutes, the expansion of the magistrate 
judge system, and the methods used by district courts to assign 
them cases. Part II.D then explains the history of habeas corpus 
and the development of 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 
A.  United States Commissioners 
Congress originally permitted “any person having authority 
from a circuit court . . . which authority . . . any circuit 
 
 25. 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015). 
 26. See infra note 362 and accompanying text. 
 27. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.  
 28. See infra Part II.B.  
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court . . . may give to one or more discreet persons learned in the 
law” to take bail in criminal cases.29 This use of non-Article III 
adjudicators, appointed by the circuit courts, set the stage for 
the creation of the United States Commissioner System.30 
Congress formally established the United States Commissioner 
System in 1896.31 From the start, the jurisdictional scope of 
these adjuncts was in question.32 Many courts took the view that 
commissioner jurisdiction was equivalent to that of a justice of 
the peace.33 This meant commissioners were limited to 
adjudicating non-civil cases, holding probable cause hearings, 
issuing search and arrest warrants, setting bail, and trying 
petty offenses.34 
The commissioner system operated this way for nearly 
one-hundred years.35 Then in the 1960s, Congress decided it was 
time for major changes to the commissioner system because of a 
lack of formal procedures in hearings, a limited jurisdictional 
scope, and only 30 percent of commissioners lacking any formal 
 
 29. Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 4, 1 Stat. 333 (emphasis added). There 
was no formal education requirement for these adjudicators and the 
qualifications were left to the discretion of the circuit courts. Id.  
 30. See Joseph F. Spaniol, Jr., The Federal Magistrates Act: History and 
Development, 1974 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 565, 566 (discussing the reasons for creating 
the new commissioner system).  
 31. See PETER G. MCCABE, A GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE JUDGE 
SYSTEM, FED. BAR ASS’N 7 n.4 (2014), https://perma.cc/P8BG-A76D (PDF) 
(explaining the origins of magistrate judges). 
 32. See id. at 9 (contrasting “U.S. Commissioners” with “park 
commissioners”). Congress better explained park commissioner duties 
compared to U.S. Commissioners. See id. (stating that park commissioners 
were able to “hear and determine petty offenses on designated federal 
territories, national parks, and roads”). 
 33. See United States v. Maresca, 266 F. 713, 720 (S.D.N.Y. 1920) 
(limiting commissioner authority to “arresting, imprisoning or bailing 
offenders against laws of the United States” (internal quotations omitted)).  
 34. See Charles A. Lindquist, The Origin and Development of the United 
States Commissioner System, 14 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 1–2 (1970) (describing 
the four major functions of U.S. Commissioners).  
 35. See Andrew Chesley, Note, The Scope of United States Magistrate 
Judge Authority After Stern v. Marshall, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 757, 761 (2016) 
(discussing several reasons why Congress enacted the Federal Magistrates Act 
of 1968). 
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legal training.36 As a result, the Judicial Conference of the 
United States asked the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts to 
draft new legislation.37 This legislation overhauled the 
qualifications and jurisdictional reach of these new federal 
magistrates and replaced the commissioner system.38 
B.  Jurisdictional Expansion 
The Federal Magistrate Judge Act of 1968 required 
magistrate judges to be “a member in good standing of the bar 
of the highest court of a State for five years.”39 Aside from 
codifying these formal qualifications, Congress expanded 
magistrate judge jurisdictional authority by authorizing them 
to try and enter final judgment in minor criminal offenses.40 
Congress also gave district courts room to expand the use of 
magistrate judges, allowing magistrates to conduct other 
“additional duties” as determined by the district courts.41 A few 
years later, Congress formalized magistrate judge 
compensation, setting their pay at 75 percent of a district 
 
 36. See Hearings on U.S. Commissioner System Before the Subcomm. on 
Improvements in the Judicial Machinery of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
89th Cong. 15–18 (1965) (statement of F. Archie Meatyard Jr., U.S. Comm’r, 
Bethesda, MD) (justifying Congress changing the qualifications, salary, and 
role of commissioners).  
 37. See MCCABE, supra note 31, at 9–10 (describing the events prompting 
the drafting of the new legislation). The Judicial Conference is the “federal 
judiciary’s policymaking body.” Id. at 9.  
 38. See Federal Magistrate Judge Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 
1107, 1108 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)) (providing the new law 
as drafted by the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts).  
 39. 28 U.S.C. § 631(b)(1).  
 40. While many district courts permitted commissioners to conduct petty 
offense trials, there was no statutory authorization for this, resulting in only 
70 percent of commissioners exercising this power. Lindquist, supra note 34, 
at 2. 
 41. See 28 U.S.C. § 636 (listing the jurisdiction and powers given to 
magistrate judges); Peter G. McCabe, The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, 16 
HARV. J. LEGIS. 343, 349 (1979) (discussing three basic duties of federal 
magistrate judges under the 1968 Act). These categories are: (1) all the 
previous power of U.S. Commissioners; (2) the “trial and disposition of minor 
criminal offenses”; and (3) “additional duties” to assist district judges. Id. In 
the third category was “preliminary review of prisoner habeas corpus 
petitions.” Id. 
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judge.42 In 1988, Congress, feeling generous, increased 
magistrate and bankruptcy judges’ salary to 92 percent of the 
salary of a district judge.43 
From the beginning, the jurisdictional scope of magistrate 
judge authority was challenged. One question involving habeas 
corpus that was resolved by the Supreme Court was whether 
magistrate judges could preside over evidentiary hearings in 
habeas cases.44 The Court held this power was beyond the scope 
of magistrate judge authority.45 Congress, in response, gave 
magistrate judges that power in 1976.46  
In 1979, Congress once again increased magistrate judge 
jurisdiction.47 The 1979 Act added what has become known as 
“consent jurisdiction” to Title 28.48 Section 636(c) enables 
magistrate judges to, “upon consent of the parties, . . . conduct 
any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order 
the entry of judgment in the case . . . .”49 If the parties consent, 
the only check by the district court is, in extraordinary 
circumstances, for good cause, or on the judge’s own motion, to 
vacate the reference order to the magistrate judge.50 Once a 
magistrate judge enters final judgment under § 636(c), a litigant 
 
 42. See McCabe, supra note 31, at 12 (discussing the failure of the 1968 
Act to fix magistrate judge compensation).  
 43. See Judiciary Appropriations Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, § 408, 
101 Stat. 1329-26, 27 (Dec. 22, 1987) (finalizing the salary change).  
 44. See Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 472 (1974) (deciding the issue 
based on the Court’s interpretation of the “additional duties provision” of the 
Act), superseded by statute, Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-577, 90 Stat. 
2729 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)).  
 45. See id. at 472–73 (“Magistrates are prohibited only from conducting 
the actual evidentiary hearing.”).   
 46. See Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-577, 90 Stat. 2729 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)) (authorizing magistrate judges to conduct “all 
evidentiary hearings”).  
 47. Federal Magistrates Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-82, 93 Stat. 643 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)). 
 48. Id. 
 49. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).  
 50. See id. § 636(c)(4) (codifying the district court’s “control” mechanisms 
to check magistrate judge power). 
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must take any appeal directly to the court of appeals.51 Since the 
1979 Act, Congress has not statutorily changed the 
jurisdictional scope of magistrate judges.  
Over time, however, courts have expanded the power of 
magistrate judges. For example, the Supreme Court increased 
magistrate judge involvement in criminal cases in Peretz v. 
United States.52 In Peretz, the Court confronted the issue of 
whether a magistrate judge may conduct jury selection in a 
felony case with a defendant’s consent.53 The Court said the 
practice is constitutional because the district court retained 
supervision over the entire process.54 The rationale was that 
“[t]he decision whether to empanel the jury whose selection a 
magistrate has supervised . . . remains entirely with the district 
court.”55  
Similarly, in United States v. Raddatz,56 Justice Blackmun 
and a majority of the Court permitted a magistrate judge to 
preside over a suppression hearing in a felony trial and issue a 
report and recommendation to the district judge on the issue.57 
 
 51. See id. § 636(c)(3) (instructing parties to file appeal within the 
parameters set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); FED. R. CIV. P. 
73(c) (stating the time and terms to file an appeal).  
 52. 501 U.S. 923 (1991).  
 53. See id. at 924–25 (analyzing the matter under the “additional duties” 
provision of the United States Code). This provision states: “A magistrate 
judge may be assigned such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the 
Constitution and laws of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3).  
 54. See Peretz, 501 U.S. at 937 (noting that separation of powers was not 
at issue because of this supervision by the district court). The Court later 
expanded the holding of Peretz to allow a defendant’s counsel to provide 
consent for a magistrate judge to conduct voir dire. See Gonzalez v. United 
States, 553 U.S. 242, 253 (2008) (“[A] magistrate judge may preside over jury 
examination and jury selection only if the parties, or the attorneys for the 
parties, consent. Consent from an attorney will suffice.” (emphasis added)).  
 55. Peretz, 501 U.S. at 937 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
The Court said, “[b]ecause the entire process takes place under the district 
court’s total control and jurisdiction, there is no danger that use of the 
magistrate involves a constitutional attempt to transfer jurisdiction to 
non-Article III tribunals for the purpose of emasculating constitutional 
courts.” Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 56. 447 U.S. 667 (1980). 
 57. See id. at 680–81 (“We conclude that the due process rights claimed 
here are adequately protected . . . .”). Magistrate judges may issue Reports 
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Justice Blackmun stressed that because the district court 
supervised the entire process and ultimately made the final 
determination whether to adopt the recommendation, no 
constitutional concerns were present.58 As will be discussed 
later, the Court has been willing to expand magistrate judge 
involvement only where there is direct supervision and 
reviewability by the district court. 
C.  Assignment of Cases to Magistrate Judges 
The expansion by Congress and the Supreme Court of 
magistrate judge jurisdiction has led district courts to change 
the way magistrate judges receive their assignments.59 
Magistrate judges disposed of 17,112 civil cases under § 636(c) 
jurisdiction from September 2017–September 2018.60 One small 
but important factor that determines how much power a 
magistrate judge has is how the district courts assign them 
cases.  
The assignment of cases, where consent jurisdiction is 
possible, varies widely.61 Previously, most district courts used 
 
and Recommendations (R&Rs) on any evidentiary issue. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 636(b)(1)(B) (stating that magistrate judges must “submit to a judge of the 
court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition”).  
 58. See Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 687 (Blackmun, J., concurring) 
[T]he handling of suppression motions invariably remains 
completely in the control of the federal district court. The judge may 
initially decline to refer any matter to a magistrate. When a matter 
is referred, the judge may freely reject the magistrate’s 
recommendation. He may rehear the evidence in whole or in part. 
He may call for additional findings or otherwise “recommit the 
matter to the magistrate with instructions.” (citation omitted). 
 59. See MCCABE, supra note 31, at 24 (referencing a 1983 General 
Accounting Office report encouraging district courts to use magistrate judges 
more).  
 60. THE FEDERAL BENCH—ANNUAL REPORT, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS. 
(2018), perma.cc/7W9S-SF2B (PDF). 
 61. See MCCABE, supra note 31, at 44 (discussing the method of 
assignment of civil cases); 18 BRUCE A. CARROLL, THE ROLE, DESIGN, AND 
GROWING IMPORTANCE OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGES 42–46 (Edwin 
Mellen Press ed., 2004) (categorizing the ways district courts assign cases to 
magistrate judges). Carroll breaks the categories down into the random 
method, rotating method, a paired system, a chief magistrate system, a district 
judge system, and other miscellaneous methods. Id. at 42.  
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some type of pairing system to assign cases to magistrate 
judges.62 This randomly pairs a magistrate judge and district 
judge together for a particular case.63 A variation of that system 
pairs magistrate judges with a particular district judge for a 
definite time period—say six months.64 Both systems allow 
magistrate judges to directly handle pre-trial matters and any 
matters the district judge refers to them.65  
In contrast, the system now used in many district courts, 
adds magistrate judges to the random assignment 
system— directly assigning them civil cases.66 If the parties do 
not consent to the magistrate judge,67 a district judge is 
reassigned.68 This direct assignment of § 2255 motions to 
magistrate judges continues in many district courts,69 despite 
the Magistrate Judge Committee suggesting it is not 
appropriate to directly assign § 2255 motions to magistrate 
judges.70  
 
 62. See MCCABE, supra note 31, at 44 (describing the two types of pairing 
systems).  
 63. Id. 
 64. See id. (noting that district courts assign cases to both a district judge 
and her paired magistrate). 
 65. See id. (discussing the benefits and drawbacks of the system). 
 66. See id. (“The Magistrate Judge is the presiding judge on a case and 
handles all case management and pretrial proceedings.”); CARROLL, supra note 
61, at 42 (stating that a case is reallocated once it goes beyond the magistrate 
judge’s jurisdiction). 
 67. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (permitting a magistrate judge to “conduct 
all proceedings” related to a civil case once the parties consent).  
 68. See MCCABE, supra note 31, at 44 (noting that this direct assignment 
system has been successful in “expediting the disposition of cases”). For better 
or worse, more parties now consent to magistrate judge disposition under this 
system. See id. (attributing this increase to litigants’ desire for a more 
expedited trial schedule).  
 69. See, e.g., Williams v. Spaulding, No. 18-cv-11554, 2019 WL 2107275, 
at *6 (D. Mass. May 14, 2019) (magistrate judge directly assigned); 
Rivera-Rivera v. United States, No. Cr. 08-0204, 2015 WL 3965962, at *4 
(D.P.R. June 30, 2015) (same). 
 70. See COMM. ON THE ADMIN. OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE SYS. OF THE JUD. 
CONF., SUGGESTIONS FOR UTILIZATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGES 8 (2013) 
(emphasizing the precarious position of magistrate judges when required to 
enter final judgment on § 2255 motions). The Committee said magistrate 
judges should submit reports and recommendations on § 2255 motions. Id. 
This is discussed in more detail, infra Part V.B. 
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Direct assignment has had the effect of magistrate judges 
adjudicating cases, including § 2255 motions, at a higher rate 
than the paired system.71 This is because most parties will 
consent to the magistrate judge’s jurisdiction. Under the paired 
system, a district judge would have to refer the case to a 
magistrate, who would then obtain the parties’ consent. That 
extra hurdle kept § 2255 motions in front of a district judge 
more than direct assignment.  
D.  Habeas Corpus and the History of § 2255 
“The Framers viewed freedom from unlawful restraint as a 
fundamental precept of liberty, and they understood the writ of 
habeas corpus as a vital instrument to secure that freedom.”72 
While on the minds of the Framers during the founding of the 
Republic,73 the writ of habeas corpus traces its origins to 
England where it was used to enforce Magna Carta.74 
Originally, English citizens were unable to use the writ as a way 
to secure their rights—rather, the Monarchy used it to control 
lords and barons who enforced the law.75 Slowly courts began 
 
 71. Compare ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., 2019 STATISTICAL TABLES FOR 
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, tbl.M-5 (showing 17,817 civil cases terminated under 
§ 636(c) jurisdiction), and ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., 2018 STATISTICAL 
TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, tbl.M-5 (revealing 17,113 civil cases 
terminated under § 636(c) jurisdiction), with ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., 
2010 STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, tbl.M-5 (reporting only 
12,470 civil cases terminated by magistrate judges under § 636(c) jurisdiction).  
 72. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739 (2008).  
 73. Id.; see THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The establishment of the writ of habeas corpus . . . [is] 
perhaps [a] greater securit[y] to liberty and republicanism than any it [the 
Constitution] contains.”).  
 74. See 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 112 (1926) (noting 
how habeas corpus eventually became a way to enforce Magna Carta’s promise 
and prevent false imprisonment); see also MAGNA CARTA cl. 39, reprinted in 
J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 461 (2d ed. 1992) (“No free man shall be taken or 
imprisoned . . . except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the 
land.”). 
 75. See Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause: 
English Text, Imperial Contexts, and American Implications, 94 VA. L. REV. 
575, 585 (2008) (explaining that kings and queens used the writ as a check on 
the power of lords and barons).  
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issuing writs to seek information about the legality of a prison 
to hold one of the king or queen’s subjects.76 
By the early seventeenth century, chaos erupted in England 
when The House of Commons passed a statute condemning 
“imprison[ment] without any cause.”77 King Charles I, in 
response, defied the statute and dissolved Parliament.78 When 
Parliament reconvened, they passed The Act of 1640 which 
“expressly authorized use of the writ to test the legality of 
commitment by command or warrant of the King or the Privy 
Council.”79 After more unrest, Parliament reaffirmed its 
commitment to liberty and passed the Habeas Corpus Act of 
1679 which established a procedural scheme for issuing writs of 
habeas corpus and vested the courts with the power to grant 
those writs.80 Parliament was clear that the 1679 Act even gave 
courts which lacked criminal jurisdiction, like the court of 
common pleas, the power to grant writs.81 Ultimately, this 
procedural scheme and common law authority became the basis 
of early American habeas relief.82 
Article I, Section 9 of the United States Constitution 
provides, “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not 
be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the 
 
 76. See 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 1341, at 237 (3d ed. 1858) (“[F]or it is said, that the king is entitled, 
at all times, to have an account, why the liberty of any of his subjects is 
restrained.”).  
 77. Petition of Right, 3 Car. 1, ch. 1 (1627), reprinted in 5 Statutes of the 
Realm 23, 24 (1963). 
 78. See W. HALL & R. ALBION, A HISTORY OF ENGLAND AND THE BRITISH 
EMPIRE 328 (3d ed. 1953) (detailing the King’s response to the legislation 
passed by the House of Commons).  
 79. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 742 (citing The Act of 1640, 16 Car. 1, ch. 10, 
reprinted in 5 Statutes of the Realm, at 110).  
 80. See Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Car. 2, ch. 2 (codifying only the 
procedural scheme for bringing a habeas petition).  
 81. See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 80–81 (1807) (“Whence 
does the court of common pleas derive this power? Not from its criminal 
jurisdiction; for it has none. Not from any statute . . . . But from the great 
protective principle of the common law . . . .”).  
 82. See Halliday & White, supra note 75, at 583 (discussing the import of 
the statute into the Suspension Clause of the Constitution and state habeas 
statutes).  
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public Safety may require it.”83 The Suspension Clause is a 
unique part of the Constitution because it comes almost 
unedited from English law.84 The Framers chose to include only 
the limits on suspending the writ in the Constitution—there 
was no affirmation of it—because each state already provided 
for the right.85 This meant that at the inception of the United 
States, habeas corpus proceedings were left to the states to 
administer.86 
That system did not last long. In the late eighteenth 
century, Congress granted federal courts the ability to grant 
writs of habeas corpus in the Judiciary Act of 1789.87 The 1789 
Act vested the Supreme Court with jurisdiction to review state 
supreme court decisions on habeas petitions.88 As the federal 
judiciary grew, Congress gave district courts original 
jurisdiction to hear “all cases where any person may be 
restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or 
of any treaty or law of the United States.”89  
More key changes came about in the creation of the modern 
habeas statutes in 1948. The Judicial Conference of Senior 
Circuit Judges drafted the legislation that created 28 U.S.C. 
 
 83. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.  
 84. See Halliday & White, supra note 75, at 583 (“Unlike other parts of 
the Constitution, in which English practices—for instance, impeachment or 
writs of election—were transformed to serve a new constitutional design, the 
Suspension Clause carried the writ of habeas corpus out of English practice 
and into American law with little additional jurisprudential baggage.”). 
 85. See WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS 
CORPUS 128–31 (1980) (“The chief concern . . . was over the power to 
suspend.”).  
 86. See Brandon L. Garrett, Habeas Corpus and Due Process, 98 CORNELL 
L. REV. 47, 65 (2012) (“In the United States, as in England, the common law 
writ continued to operate . . . at the state level . . . .”).  
 87. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82 (providing 
courts with the statutory authorization to adjudicate habeas corpus petitions); 
Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 95 (describing the right as a “great 
constitutional privilege” supporting federal court jurisdiction). 
 88. See Judiciary Act of 1789, § 25, 1 Stat. at 85–87 (permitting review 
under writ-of-error when the decision of the state supreme court is “repugnant 
to the constitution, treaties or laws of the United States”).  
 89. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 211 (1952).  
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§ 2255.90 Section 2255 was created to provide federal prisoners 
relief as broad as habeas corpus.91 Today, § 2255 motions are a 
form of post-conviction relief because jurisdiction for these 
motions lies in the court that sentenced the movant, rather than 
in their district of confinement.92 
Until 1976, courts applied the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure to § 2255 motions.93 Then, the Supreme Court 
requested the promulgation of the Rules Governing Section 2255 
Proceedings in the United States District Courts.94 In drafting 
these rules, the advisory committee chose a mixture of civil and 
criminal rules to govern the proceedings.95 Justifying this 
mixture, the advisory committee noted that while a § 2255 
motion appears to be a civil proceeding, it is simply a step in the 
movant’s criminal proceeding.96 This explanation has sparked 
much debate over the proper classification of § 2255 motions.97 
 
 90. See Act of Sept. 14, 1922, ch. 206, § 2, 42 Stat. 837, 838–39 
(establishing the Conference); see also 28 U.S.C. § 331 (describing the 
Conference as one who examines the condition of business in the federal courts 
and recommends legislation to Congress).  
 91. See Brendan W. Randall, United States v. Cooper: The Writ of Error 
Coram Nobis and the Morgan Footnote Paradox, 74 MINN. L. REV. 1063, 
1074– 75 (1990) (discussing the legislative history of § 2255); Judicial 
Conference Committee on Habeas Corpus Procedure to Chairmen of House and 
Senate Judiciary Committees, 79th Cong. (1945) (statement of Chief Justice 
Stone) (“As a remedy, [§ 2255] is intended to be as broad as habeas corpus.”).  
 92. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 2255, 62 Stat. 869, 967 (codified 
as amended 28 U.S.C. § 2255) (“[M]ay move the court which imposed the 
sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.” (emphasis added)). 
 93. See, e.g., Helfin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 418 n.7 (1959) 
(applying the civil time to appeal to a § 2255 motion).  
 94. See Rules Governing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Cases and § 2255 Proceedings, 
425 U.S. 1167, 1169, 1181–87 (1976) (describing the purpose of the rules and 
the scope of the advisory committee’s work). Congress later approved the 
promulgated rules with only minor changes. See Act of Sept. 28, 1976, Pub. L. 
No. 94-426, §§ 1, 2, 90 Stat. 1334, 1334–35 (1976) (codified as amended 28 
U.S.C. foll. § 2255).  
 95. See Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States 
District Courts, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2255 (providing the district courts with 
guidance on matters such as when to conduct hearings and what burden of 
proof applies).  
 96. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.  
 97. See infra Part III.A. 
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III.  Magistrate Judge Statutory Authority Over § 2255 
Motions 
As discussed, consent jurisdiction permits magistrate 
judges to enter final judgment only in civil matters.98 This raises 
the question whether § 2255 motions are civil matters under 
§ 636(c) consent jurisdiction. The courts of appeals are split on 
this issue.99 To resolve the issue, courts must consider (1) 
whether § 2255 motions are civil, criminal, or hybrid 
proceedings, and (2) which of these three classifications fall 
within the term “civil matter?” 
A.  Circuit Split on Statutory Authority 
In Brown v. United States,100 the Eleventh Circuit 
considered whether § 636(c) statutorily permits magistrate 
judges to adjudicate § 2255 motions.101 Brown was found guilty 
of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), which makes it a crime to 
persuade an individual under the age of eighteen to engage in 
sexual activity.102 He was found to be a career offender under 
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and was sentenced to 235 
months in prison.103 Brown later filed a § 2255 motion arguing, 
among other things, that the district court’s determination that 
he was a career offender was incorrect.104 Brown and the 
 
 98. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (“[A] United States magistrate judge . . . may 
conduct any and all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the 
entry of judgment in the case . . . .” (emphasis added)).  
 99. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 100. 748 F.3d 1045 (2014). 
 101. See id. at 1047 (deciding the issue on statutory grounds despite the 
appeal objecting to the constitutionality of the practice).  
 102. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). 
 103. Brown, 748 F.3d at 1048; see U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 4B.1.1(a) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2020) (defining “career offender” as one who 
(1) was at least eighteen years old when he committed the instant offense; (2) 
that offense is a felony crime of violence or controlled substance offense; and 
(3) the defendant has two prior felony convictions for violence or controlled 
substance offenses).  
 104. See Brown, 748 F.3d at 1048 n.5 (“Brown claimed that he was 
wrongfully sentenced as a career offender because his conviction under 18 
U.S.C. § 2422(b) was not a crime of violence in light of intervening Supreme 
Court and Eleventh Circuit case law . . . .”). 
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Government consented to a magistrate judge adjudicating the 
motion.105 Once Brown consented, and without an evidentiary 
hearing, the magistrate judge denied his motion.106 
The Eleventh Circuit granted review and first addressed 
whether § 2255 motions fall under § 636(c) jurisdiction.107 After 
a thorough examination of the legislative history, the court said 
there was no “indication in the legislative history of the 1979 
Act that Congress intended that § 636(c) reach habeas corpus or 
§ 2255 proceedings—or even that it considered that such a 
situation might occur.”108  
The Government offered the syllogism that because habeas 
corpus statutes, like § 2254 are civil, and because § 2254 and 
§ 2255 are analogous proceedings, it follows that § 2255 is a civil 
proceeding.109 The court disagreed. It found that § 2255 is not 
analogous to habeas relief.110 While magistrate judges can enter 
final judgment in § 2254 matters under § 636(c),111 § 2255 
proceedings are a “distinct procedural avenue,” and do not share 
the same substantive characteristics as other habeas 
 
 105. Id. at 1048. 
 106. See id. (concluding that the motion failed to state a basis for granting 
relief). Brown’s subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied by the 
magistrate judge. Id.  
 107. See id. at 1050–55 (considering the statutory issue to avoid the 
constitutional questions presented). The court decided the issue on statutory 
grounds to comply with “[p]rinciples of constitutional avoidance.” Id. at 1072. 
This counsels courts to “consider the necessary consequences of its choice. If 
one of them would raise a multitude of constitutional problems, the other 
should prevail.” Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380–81 (2005).  
 108. Brown, 748 F.3d at 1056. 
 109. See id. at 1060 (arguing that the similarities between the proceedings 
compel the court to find § 2255 motions are civil proceedings and thus a “civil 
matter” under § 636(c)).  
 110. See id. at 1059–60 (“[A] § 2255 motion ‘is not a habeas corpus 
proceeding . . . .’” (quoting United States v. Hayman, 324 U.S. 205, 220 
(1952))).  
 111. Id. at 1060–61; see, e.g., Sinclair v. Wainwright, 814 F.2d 1516, 1522 
(11th Cir. 1987) (authorizing magistrate judge disposition of § 2254 motions 
under § 636(c) jurisdiction); Farmer v. Litscher, 303 F.3d 840, 845 (7th Cir. 
2020) (same).  
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statutes.112 These differences mean § 2255 motions cannot be 
civil proceedings just because their origins trace back to habeas 
relief.113 
The court justified this interpretation by citing the advisory 
committee note to the Rules Governing Section 2255 
Proceedings which classifies § 2255 motions as criminal.114 The 
advisory committee based its determination on the legislative 
history of the 1948 statute, which first created § 2255.115 The 
advisory committee said that because of the remedies available 
under § 2255,116 a magistrate judge would be able to directly 
resentence or order the release of a movant convicted of a 
felony.117 Those remedies are not civil and fall outside the civil 
matters scope of § 636(c).118 Section 2254, on the other hand, has 
a more indirectly administered remedy, requiring a federal 
judge to issue an order directing the state court to release or 
modify the movant’s sentence.119 Thus, the federal court cannot 
 
 112. See Brown v. United States, 748 F.3d 1045, 1061 (2014) (noting that 
while these statutes are procedurally similar in application, the relief given is 
much different).  
 113. See id. (“[W]e must canvas the history of § 2255 to divine its true 
nature.”). 
 114. See id. at 1062–63 (relying on the statement that § 2255 motions are 
another step in a movant’s criminal proceedings). 
 115. See S. REP. NO. 80-1256, at 2 (1948) (“Since the motion remedy is in 
the criminal proceeding, [§ 2255] affords the opportunity and expressly gives 
the broad powers to set aside the judgment and to discharge the prisoner or 
resentence him or grant a new trial . . . .” (emphasis added) (internal quotation 
and citation omitted)).  
 116. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (permitting the reviewing judge to “vacate, set 
aside or correct the sentence”).  
 117. See Brown, 748 F.3d at 1064 (“[T]he § 2255 proceeding does not 
conclude until the relief ordered has been completed.” (citing United States v. 
Futch, 518 F.3d 887, 894 (11th Cir. 2008))). 
 118. See United States v. Hadden, 475 F.3d 652, 665 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(“Thus, although the proceeding [§ 2255] is technically civil in nature, the 
remedy entered pursuant to the proceeding is often technically criminal in 
nature, as it relates directly to the prisoner’s criminal punishment.” (internal 
citations omitted)).  
 119. See, e.g., Williams v. Jones, No. 03-cv-201, 2010 WL 3834580, at *1 
(E.D. Okla. Sept. 29, 2010) (granting the movant’s § 2254 motion and ordering 
the State of Oklahoma to release petitioner from custody).  
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order relief directly.120 This meant under § 2255, magistrate 
judges are directly involved in felony sentencing, another 
jurisdictional and constitutional issue in and of itself.121 
For these reasons, the Brown court found that § 2255 
proceedings are not civil matters for purposes of consent 
jurisdiction.122 But the court was clear that there was no definite 
answer on whether § 2255 is a criminal or civil proceeding.123 
That it could be both, bolsters the argument to exclude it from 
§ 636(c) jurisdiction.124 One might argue that finding statutory 
jurisdiction lacking was only a way for the court to avoid the 
constitutional separation of powers concern addressed later in 
the opinion.125 Either way, the court was clear—magistrate 
judge’s cannot statutorily adjudicate § 2255 proceedings under 
§ 636(c).126  
In United States v. Johnston,127 the Fifth Circuit reached 
the opposite conclusion, despite holding magistrate judge 
adjudication of § 2255 motions violates constitutional 
separation of powers.128 In determining whether § 2255 motions 
are civil matters, the court said that § 2255 is “generally 
construed” as being civil.129 Still, the court recognized that 
 
 120. See id. (requiring the state court to issue an order releasing the 
movant).  
 121. See Brown, 748 F.3d at 1067 (“[A]llowing a magistrate judge to enter 
final judgment on a § 2255 motion would upset a federal criminal conviction, 
and Congress has never authorized magistrate judges . . . to try federal felony 
offenses.”).  
 122. See id. at 1068 (“[W]e hold that a § 2255 proceeding is not a civil 
matter so as to avoid Article III concerns.”).  
 123. See id. (“Whether § 2255 is a ‘civil proceeding’ that a magistrate judge 
can decide is ambiguous.”).  
 124. See id. (noting that only entirely civil proceedings should fall under 
§ 636(c) jurisdiction).  
 125. See id. (invoking the doctrine of constitutional avoidance as one 
reason for its holding).  
 126. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.  
 127. 258 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 128. See id. at 366 (“[A] § 2255 proceeding is a civil matter over which 
Congress intended magistrate judges to exercise jurisdiction upon consent of 
the parties.”); see also infra Part IV.C, for a more in-depth discussion of the 
facts of United States v. Johnston and the court’s constitutional analysis. 
 129. See id. at 365 (referring to § 2255’s relationship to other habeas 
relief). 
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§ 2255 is distinct from traditional habeas corpus and does have 
qualities of a criminal proceeding.130 But the opinion 
emphasized that courts should not place “undue importance” on 
the advisory committee’s note that § 2255 motions are a step in 
the movant’s criminal proceeding.131 After reviewing the text 
and legislative history of § 636(c), the court held that § 2255 
proceedings are civil matters capable of magistrate judge 
disposition.132 
B.  Resolving the Split 
A two-step analysis can determine whether magistrate 
judges may adjudicate § 2555 motions under § 636(c). First, are 
§ 2255 motions criminal, civil, or hybrid proceedings?133 Second, 
which of those classifications did Congress intend to be a “civil 
matter” under § 636(c)?134 
1.  Classification of § 2255 Motions 
Several arguments support § 2255 motions being classified 
as civil proceedings. First, § 2255 is in Title 28 of the United 
States Code, which applies to civil proceedings, unlike Title 18 
which applies to criminal proceedings.135 Second, as the 
Supreme Court stated, because § 2255 is analogous to § 2254, 
and § 2254 proceedings are civil, § 2255 proceedings must also 
 
 130. See id. (“On the other hand, we have at times suggested that § 2255 
motions are conceptually distinguishable from habeas proceedings . . . .”). 
 131. See id. at 365–66 (noting that classifying § 2255 motions “remains 
highly dependent on the proceedings’ context” (internal quotations and 
citations omitted)); infra note 147 and accompanying text.  
 132. See Johnston, 258 F.3d at 366 (“In light of that statutory framework 
and legislative intent, we hold that for purposes of § 636(c), a § 2255 
proceeding is a civil matter over which Congress intended magistrate judges 
to exercise jurisdiction upon consent of the parties.”). 
 133. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 134. See infra Part III.B.2.  
 135. See Robbins, supra note 12, at V.A.3 (arguing that because § 2255 is 
in Title 28, Congress intended it to be civil). This argument fails because the 
Office of the Law Revision Counsel (OLRC), not Congress, classifies every 
public law and “determine[s] where it should go into the Code.” See About 
Classification of Laws to the United States Code, OFF. OF THE L. REVISION 
COUNS., perma.cc/8U3D-DN2J. 
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be civil.136 Third, as a historical matter, since § 2255 is a form of 
habeas relief—tracing its roots to England—and the power to 
grant habeas writs originated in courts that only exercised civil 
jurisdiction, § 2255 motions must be civil proceedings.137 
Fourth, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), which governs 
appeals in civil cases138 is the appellate rule used in § 2255 
proceedings.139  
Taken together, however, these characteristics only confirm 
§ 2255 motions are procedurally civil.140 None of these 
characteristics look at the substance of the rights being 
adjudicated. This means § 2255 can still be substantively 
criminal, despite being procedurally civil.  
Courts have focused on these procedural aspects in 
classifying § 2255 motions as independent civil proceedings.141 
In Baker v. United States,142 the Eighth Circuit determined that 
a § 2255 motion attacks a criminal conviction but is not a 
continuation of it.143 The court said a § 2255 motion was “a 
 
 136. See Williams v. United States, 984 F.2d 28, 29 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding 
§ 2255 is a civil proceeding); Robbins, supra note 12, at V.A.3 (analyzing 
whether § 2255 motions are civil or criminal). But see supra note 135 and 
accompanying text. 
 137. See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 80–81 (1807) (noting that 
when the writ was established in England, courts lacking criminal jurisdiction 
had power to issue the writ). 
 138. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A) (“In a civil case . . . notice of 
appeal . . . must be filed . . . within 30 days after entry of judgment or order 
appealed from.”).  
 139. See Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States 
District Courts, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2255, Rule 11 (stating the applicable rule 
governing the time to file an appeal); Williams, 984 F.2d at 29 (applying rule 
4(a) to a § 2255 motion). 
 140. See supra notes 135–139 and accompanying text. 
 141. See Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 418 n.7 (1959) (“For a 
motion under § 2255, like a petition for a writ of habeas corpus . . . is not a 
proceeding in the original criminal prosecution but an independent civil 
suit.”). The Court made this classification, however, before the advisory 
committee notes to the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings stated 
§ 2255 was part of the movant’s criminal proceeding. See 8 CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 622 (4th ed. 2013) (noting 
criticism over the civil classification of § 2255).  
 142. 334 F.2d 444 (8th Cir. 1964). 
 143. See id. at 447 (holding that because a § 2255 motion is a civil 
proceeding the movant had no right to court-appointed counsel).  
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special civil rather than a criminal proceeding.”144 Likewise, the 
Third Circuit concluded that a motion to vacate sentence under 
§ 2255 is “not a proceeding in the original criminal prosecution 
but an independent civil suit.”145 Despite recognizing the 
criminal aspects of § 2255, the Seventh Circuit explained that a 
§ 2255 motion “is a step in a criminal proceeding yet is, at the 
same time, civil in nature and subject to the civil rules of 
procedure.”146  
By contrast, the advisory committee who drafted the Rules 
Governing Section 2255 Proceedings, said § 2255 motions are “a 
further step in a movant’s criminal case and not a separate civil 
action.”147 The committee believed Congress explicitly left out a 
filing fee in § 2255 “to recognize . . . the nature of a § 2255 
motion as being a continuation of the criminal case.”148 The 
Senate Report supplementing the Bill that enacted § 2255 
supports the advisory committee’s statements. The report noted 
that a motion brought under § 2255 is a “criminal proceeding” 
because the remedy afforded is criminal.149  
Indeed, the remedies under § 2255 differ from those 
available under traditional habeas relief.150 Unlike § 2254, 
§ 2255 remedies are broader in scope and are more directly 
 
 144. Id. at 447. 
 145. Jenkins v. United States, 325 F.2d 942, 944 (3d Cir. 1963). 
 146. United States v. Balistrieri, 606 F.2d 216, 221 (7th Cir. 1979) 
(concluding that § 2255 is an independent civil proceeding).  
 147. See Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States 
District Courts, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2255, Rule 11 advisory committee’s note 
(explaining the differences between § 2255 and traditional habeas relief). 
 148. See id. at Rule 3 n.1 (“This is a change from the practice of charging 
$15 and is done to recognize specifically the nature of a § 2255 motion as being 
a continuation of the criminal case . . . .”).  
 149. See S. REP. NO. 96-74, at 1–3 (1948) (differentiating between the 
procedural and substantive aspects of § 2255). 
 150. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (permitting the judge to directly order the 
appropriate relief), with 17B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 4268.4 (3d ed. 2007)  
Grant of a writ of habeas corpus [under § 2254] need not result in 
the unconditional release of the prisoner. It may do so, but much 
more commonly the prisoner will be ordered discharged unless the 
prisoner is retried within a reasonable time which may be specified 
in the order.  
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administered by the reviewing judge.151 This is because, under 
§ 2254, a federal judge may only order the state court to release 
the movant—the federal judge cannot directly order his 
release.152 Under § 2255, however, the reviewing judge may 
order the relief directly and release the movant or resentence 
him.153 Thus, because the remedy in a § 2254 motion is only a 
civil order,154 it is more like a civil proceeding. Section 2255, by 
contrast, must be different since the district judge administers 
the remedy directly by amending the original sentencing 
order.155  
Some courts have said this remedial scheme proves that 
§ 2255 motions are criminal proceedings. For example, the 
Second Circuit held that a § 2255 motion is not an independent 
civil proceeding.156 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit classifies § 2255 
proceedings as criminal.157 In United States v. Cook,158 the 
Tenth Circuit noted that while a § 2255 motion has the 
“characteristics of a writ of habeas corpus,”159 it is not a habeas 
proceeding, but is merely a “continuation of the original 
criminal action.”160  
 
 151. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (authorizing the reviewing judge to vacate and 
resentence the movant).  
 152. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 150, § 4268.4 (stating the federal court 
is limited to ordering the state court to act); supra note 119 and accompanying 
text. 
 153. See 3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 635 (4th ed. 1995) (noting that not only may the judge resentence 
the movant based on the success of a § 2255 motion, she may also resentence 
the movant on “other counts that were not challenged by the motion”). 
 154. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (permitting a district court to remand a case 
for want of jurisdiction which orders the state court to take back jurisdiction).  
 155. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.  
 156. See Williams v. United States, 984 F.2d 28, 29 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(concluding that because § 2255 is not civil, the procedure set out in Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 58 for entry of judgment does not apply). Rule 58 sets 
out the procedure for entry of judgment by district courts in civil proceedings. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 58. 
 157. See United States v. Martin, 226 F.3d 1042, 1047 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(emphasizing “it is now clear” that § 2255 motions are a further step in the 
movant’s criminal proceeding).  
 158. 997 F.2d 1312 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 159. Id. at 1316 n.3. 
 160. Id. at 1315 n.1. 
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In short, § 2255 includes remedies comparable to the 
sentencing phase of a criminal case while proceeding through 
the courts like a civil proceeding.161 A proper resolution, then, is 
to classify § 2255 motions as hybrid proceedings that are both 
civil and criminal. In United States v. Means,162 the Sixth 
Circuit did just that.163 The court made no categorical 
classification of § 2255 motions because aspects of the 
proceeding point to it being both civil and criminal.164 The court 
acknowledged the civil procedural posture and criminal 
remedies the statute affords.165 Even though this hybrid 
classification is doctrinally opaque, it is the proper classification 
of a proceeding that courts so often disagree about.166 Thus, the 
answer to the first question is that § 2255 motions are hybrid 
proceedings with criminal and civil characteristics.  
2.  Definition of “Civil Matter” Under § 636(c) 
The hybrid nature of § 2255 makes determining whether 
the proceeding is a civil matter harder. This is because Congress 
did not define the term “civil matter” in § 636(c).167 The scope of 
the term has instead been left to the courts to decide.168 When 
 
 161. Cf. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 293–94 (1969) (“It is, of course, 
true that habeas corpus proceedings are characterized as ‘civil.’ But the label 
is gross and inexact. Essentially, the proceeding is unique.” (citations 
omitted)).  
 162. 133 F.3d 444 (6th Cir. 1998).  
 163. See id. at 448–49 (“The inescapable fact is that [§ 2255] has 
characteristics of both [civil and criminal matters], and may properly be 
categorized as one or the other depending on the context and the reason for 
making the inquiry.” (citations omitted)). 
 164. See id. at 448–49 (citing United States v. Nahodil, 36 F.3d 323, 328 
(3d Cir. 1994)) (discussing the countervailing classifications of § 2255 
motions). 
 165. See id. at 449 (differentiating between the procedural and substantive 
aspects).  
 166. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.  
 167. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (failing to define the term “civil matter” in 
the statute’s text or accompaniments).  
 168. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 748 F.3d 1045, 1068 (11th Cir. 2014) 
(determining whether a § 2255 proceeding is a civil matter). 
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interpreting a word in a statute, courts generally look to the 
statute’s plain text and then to the legislative history.169  
At the time of drafting, Black’s Law Dictionary defined 
“civil” as “[r]elating to private rights and remedies sought by 
civil actions as contrasted with criminal proceedings.”170 This 
indicates Congress chose to limit “civil matter” to cases relating 
to private rights and remedies.171 Here, motions under § 2255 
are not between private parties172 and do not provide private 
remedies.173 The statutory interpretation cannon expressio 
unius est exclusion alterius, or “the expression of one thing 
excludes the alternatives,” also cautions that by only including 
cases relating to private rights and remedies, Congress 
deliberately excluded cases with criminal rights and 
remedies.174 Taken together, the statute’s text suggests § 636(c) 
 
 169. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES 
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:1 (7th ed. 2008) (noting that courts are 
bound to the plain meaning of a word in a statute and only when that term is 
ambiguous should the intent of the legislators be “gleaned”). Moreover, 
“[w]here a statutory provision is clear and unambiguous, and not 
unreasonable or illogical in its operation, a court may not go outside the 
statute to give it a different meaning.” Id. But where the relevant legislative 
history would import a different meaning, courts may consider the legislative 
history even when the text is unambiguous. See id. (discussing the limitations 
and exceptions to the plain meaning rule).  
 170. Civil, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979). 
 171. See SINGER & SINGER, supra note 169, § 47:7 (explaining that when 
legislators do not define the words in a statute, courts will give that word its 
“common and ordinary meaning”). One way to determine the common meaning 
is through a dictionary definition. Id. 
 172. See, e.g., Brown, 748 F.3d at 1047 (showing Assistant United States 
Attorneys representing the Government’s interests). 
 173. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 174. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396 (1991) (“[I]f Congress had 
such an intent, Congress would have made it explicit in the statute . . . .”); see 
also SINGER & SINGER, supra note 169, § 47:23 (“[W]here a statute designates 
a form of conduct, the manner of its performance and operation, and the 
persons and things to which it refers, courts should infer that all omissions 
were intentional exclusions.”); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING 
LAW 107 (2012) (explaining uses of the doctrine). But see Barnhart v. Peabody 
Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003) (“[The interpretive doctrine] has force only 
when the items expressed are members of an ‘associated group or series’ . . . .” 
(citation omitted)). The question then becomes, are civil and criminal cases 
“members of an associated group?” It seems odd to say inclusion of civil would 
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does not include cases where (1) a private party is adverse to the 
Government, and (2) a criminal remedy is available.175 The 
statute thus clearly excludes criminal proceedings. But the text 
alone is unclear as to whether Congress meant § 636(c) to 
include hybrid proceedings that have criminal aspects. Because 
§ 2255 motions are hybrid proceedings, courts must look beyond 
the text of the statute, to the legislative history, to determine 
whether § 2255 motions fall under consent jurisdiction.176  
The legislative history of § 636(c) shows Congress did not 
intend the statute to include hybrid proceedings like § 2255. In 
the House Conference Report, the committee made repeated 
reference to “civil actions” and “civil cases.”177 The Senate 
Committee likewise said § 636(c) should aid district judges in 
attending to “a mounting queue of civil cases.”178 The 
justification given for expanding jurisdiction was “[i]f . . . civil 
cases are forced out of court as a result, they [litigants] lose all 
their procedural safeguards.”179 Thus, the repeated use of the 
word “civil” and absence of “criminal” in the legislative history 
shows Congress’ intent to limit § 636(c)(1) to purely civil 
proceedings.180 This history also never discusses a back log of 
criminal cases or prisoner petitions, showing Congress never 
even considered criminal proceedings or habeas when enacting 
the statute.181   
 
also imply criminal because Congress often separates them. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1251–5001 (statutes applicable only in civil contexts); 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 3001– 3772 (statutes applicable only in criminal cases).  
 175. See supra notes 170–174 and accompanying text. 
 176. See SINGER & SINGER, supra note 169, § 45:2 (stating that even the 
most carefully drafted statute is subject to multiple interpretations depending 
on the facts involved). When there is a genuine uncertainty about the statute’s 
meaning, even if a word would ordinarily be unambiguous, court “must 
consider the particular problem the legislature was addressing, prior 
legislative considerations of the problem, the act’s legislative history, 
operation, and administration, and even preexisting common law.” Id.  
 177. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 96-444, at 1–3 (1979), as reprinted in 1979 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1487, 1487–89 (using the terms synonymously).  
 178. S. REP. NO. 96-74, at 3 (1979), as reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1469, 
1470–72 (emphasis added). 
 179. Id. at 4. 
 180. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
 181. See supra notes 177–179 and accompanying text.  
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Despite this legislative history, courts cite Congress’ goal of 
increasing litigant access to federal courts to justify a broad 
interpretation of “civil matter,” to include § 2255 motions.182 The 
Fifth Circuit said, to give proper effect to Congress’ goals, “civil 
matter” should be interpreted in the broadest, rather than 
narrowest sense.183 This broad reading provides the increased 
access to courts and reduced caseloads—goals Congress set out 
to achieve when drafting the statute.184  
But this approach reads into the statute proceedings 
Congress never considered.185 Prisoner petitions and other 
criminal proceedings are never mentioned in the legislative 
history and were, by all indications, not even on the minds of 
§ 636’s drafters.186 And increasing access to courts for federal 
habeas petitioners would not have been on their minds since 
courts are the only venue where prisoners can seek such 
relief.187 Thus, Congress’ reason for expanding 
jurisdiction— litigants choosing alternative dispute 
resolution— cannot occur in § 2255 proceedings.188 
In the end, however, a § 2255 proceeding should not be a 
“civil matter.” The text of § 636(c)189 and its legislative history190 
show that while Congress did intend to increase litigants’ access 
 
 182. See, e.g., United States v. Johnston, 258 F.3d 361, 366 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(interpreting civil matters under § 636(c) broadly to include § 2255 motions). 
 183. See id. at 366 (advocating for judicial efficiency by expanding the 
scope of § 636(c) jurisdiction). 
 184. See id. (describing Congress’ two goals in enacting § 636(c)).  
 185. See United States v. Lewis, 991 F.2d 322, 324 (6th Cir. 1999) (“This 
rationale reads too much into what was not said by the legislative 
history . . . .”).  
 186. See Brown v. United States, 748 F.3d 1045, 1066 (11th Cir. 2014) 
(stating that the Senate drafted the bill to encourage litigants to remain in 
federal court rather than seeking alternative dispute resolution systems); 
supra note 179 and accompanying text.  
 187. See Brown, 748 F.3d at 1066 (“Of course, federal prisoners seeking 
postconviction relief via § 2255 cannot resolve their claims outside the 
courthouse.”).  
 188. Compare Johnston, 258 F.3d at 366 (justifying § 2255 falling under 
§ 636(c) because it increases access to federal courts), with Brown, 748 F.3d at 
1066 (explaining that § 2255 motions were never in danger of being moved to 
alternative dispute resolution).  
 189. See supra notes 169–174 and accompanying text. 
 190. See supra notes 177–187 and accompanying text.  
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to federal courts, it did not intend to make the jurisdictional 
statute a catch all for § 2255 motions and other criminal 
proceedings.191  
IV.  Constitutionality of Magistrate Judge Disposition of 
§ 2255 Motions 
Even if § 2255 motions fall within § 636(c) jurisdiction, 
Congress has violated the doctrine of separation of powers by 
allowing magistrate judges to adjudicate these proceedings. The 
unique posture by which a magistrate judge reviews a decision 
made by a district judge implicates broad separation of powers 
concerns.192 This Part of the Note will first review Supreme 
Court jurisprudence on Article III separation of powers. Then 
the Note will discuss how lower courts have dealt with 
constitutional challenges to magistrate judges adjudicating 
§ 2255 motions. Finally, this Part will determine whether 
magistrate judge adjudication of § 2255 motions violates the 
doctrine of separation of powers and whether party consent can 
cure this violation.  
A.  The Supreme Court and Article III Separation of Powers 
The Supreme Court began its Article III separation of 
powers doctrine by establishing a framework to evaluate the 
constitutionality of Congress giving Article III power to a 
non-Article III judge.193 This is known as the legislative court 
 
 191. See Brown, 748 F.3d at 1066 (“We doubt that by amending § 636 to 
allow magistrate judges to enter final judgment in civil matters, Congress also 
implicitly amended the habeas corpus chapter of Title 28 to allow magistrate 
judges to enter final judgment.”). 
 192. See id. at 1070  
This is so [separation of powers concerns] because a magistrate 
judge entertaining such a motion [§ 2255] would create an ironic 
situation whereby non-Article III magistrate judges review and 
reconsider the propriety of rulings by Article III district judges, but 
do not themselves have to worry about review by the district court. 
(internal quotation and citation omitted).  
 193. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 
63–64 (1982) (establishing the framework).  
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doctrine.194 Justice Brennan enumerated three categories of 
cases in which Congress may delegate to non-Article III 
adjudicators:195 (1) cases in territories where no state operates 
as sovereign, (2) cases adjudicated by military tribunals, and (3) 
cases involving public rights.196 Public rights cases are those 
“arising ‘between the Government and persons subject to its 
authority in connection with the performance of the 
constitutional functions of the executive or legislative 
departments.’”197 Scholars describe the creation of the 
legislative court doctrine as the shift in the Supreme Court from 
a formalistic to a more “pragmatic” approach to separation of 
powers.198  
Ultimately, this tripartite framework was eliminated and 
replaced with an even more pragmatic approach in Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission v. Schor.199 The CFTC adopted a 
regulation allowing the agency to adjudicate common law 
counterclaims that “ar[ose] out of the transaction or occurrence 
or series of transactions or occurrences set forth in the 
complaint.”200 Schor filed a claim with the CFTC against his 
broker, Conti, for violating the Commodity Exchange Act.201 
Conti answered, denied the allegation, and counterclaimed for 
the debt balance on Schor’s account (a common law claim).202 An 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) heard the case and ruled 
against Schor.203 In response, Schor challenged the statutory 
 
 194. See Richard B. Saphire & Michael E. Solimine, Shoring up Article III: 
Legislative Court Doctrine in the Post CFTC v. Schor Era, 68 B. U. L. REV. 85, 
91 (1988) (describing the doctrine as an effort “to preserve the integrity of 
[A]rticle III while accommodating Congress’s need for flexibility in the exercise 
of its enumerated powers”).  
 195. N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 70. 
 196. Id. at 64–70.  
 197. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 489 (2011) (quoting Crowell v. 
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50–51 (1932)).  
 198. See Saphire & Solimine, supra note 194, at 105 n.149 (describing the 
majority’s approach in Northern Pipeline).  
 199. 478 U.S. 833 (1986). 
 200. Id. at 837.  
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 838. 
 203. See id. (dismissing Schor’s claim and granting Conti’s counterclaim 
for the debt balance). 
Hauser.PostBlueline.docx (Do Not Delete) 1/15/2021  5:01 PM 
1990 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1959 (2020) 
 
authority of the ALJ over the counterclaim.204 The Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and 
dismissed Conti’s counterclaim, holding that the ALJ’s 
adjudication of it violated Article III separation of powers.205 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.206 Justice O’Connor, 
writing for the majority reversed, holding that the ALJ had 
statutory and constitutional authority to adjudicate the 
common law counterclaim.207 Justice O’Connor rejected the 
categorical approach taken by the Court in Northern Pipeline 
and instead adopted a balancing test, considering “the degree to 
which a grant of judicial power to a non-[A]rticle III court 
actually impinged upon [A]rticle III values.”208 This test focused 
on the threat adjudication by an non-Article III judge had on 
Article III independence and on a litigant’s right to have her 
case heard by a judge free from influence by another branch of 
government.209 The Court, however, was clear that Article III 
“does not confer on litigants an absolute right to the plenary 
consideration of every . . . claim by an Article III court.”210  
The Court also addressed waiver and consent.211 Justice 
O’Connor noted that, like other individual constitutional rights, 
 
 204. See id. (arguing that the CFTC’s rule giving the ALJ his authority 
was broader than what Congress authorized in the enabling act).  
 205. See id. at 839 (raising the constitutional issue sua sponte before oral 
argument).  
 206. Id. at 841. 
 207. See id. at 843 (“[T]he broad grant of power in § 12a(5) clearly 
authorizes the promulgation of regulations providing for adjudication of 
common law counterclaims arising out of the same transaction as a 
reparations complaint because such jurisdiction is necessary, if not critical, to 
accomplish the purposes behind the reparations program.”).  
 208.  Saphire & Solimine, supra note 194, at 121 (synthesizing the test 
adopted in Schor); see Schor, 478 U.S. at 848. 
 209. See id. (“Article III, § 1, serves both to protect the role of the 
independent judiciary within the constitutional scheme of tripartite 
government, and to safeguard litigants’ right to have claims decided before 
judges who are free from potential domination by other branches of 
government.”). 
 210. Id.  
 211. See id. (stating that independent and impartial adjudication by an 
Article III judge serves as a personal constitutional protection and is subject 
to waiver).  
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the right to an Article III adjudicator is subject to waiver.212 
Here, Schor asked Conti, who originally filed in district court, to 
bring its counterclaim before the CFTC.213 This amounted to a 
waiver of Schor’s right to have the common law claim proceed 
before an Article III judge.214 Even though this waiver mooted 
individual constitutional concerns, the Court said litigants 
cannot waive structural constitutional violations.215 This 
statement, however, was dicta because the Court concluded this 
case presented no structural violation.216 
Justice Brennan dissented with Justice Marshall.217 They 
said that the ALJ’s jurisdiction was an encroachment on Article 
III power.218 The dissent preferred keeping the rule from 
Northern Pipeline and limiting non-Article III adjudication to 
“[the] exceptions we have recognized for territorial courts, 
courts-martial, and administrative courts . . . based on certain 
exceptional powers bestowed upon Congress by the 
Constitution.”219 Justice Brennan criticized the majority’s 
balancing test because it compares functionalist goals, the 
benefits of which are immediate, against separation of powers 
 
 212. See id. at 848–49 (comparing waiver of an Article III judge to waiver 
of a jury trial).  
 213. See id. at 849–50 (noting that Schor could have proceeded in the 
district court). 
 214. See id. at 850 (reiterating that Schor was the one who asked Conti to 
dismiss the district court case in favor of the bankruptcy judge adjudicating 
it). 
 215. See id. at 850–51 (“To the extent that this structural principle 
[separation of powers] is implicated in a given case, the parties cannot by 
consent cure the constitutional difficulty for the same reason that the parties 
by consent cannot confer on federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction beyond 
the limitations imposed by Article III, § 2.” (emphasis added)). 
 216. See id. (concluding the ALJ did not infringe on Article III 
independence when he adjudicated Conti’s counterclaim).  
 217. Id. at 859 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
 218. See id. at 860 (“The separation of powers and the checks and balances 
that the Framers built into our tripartite form of government were intended 
to operate as a ‘self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or 
aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other.’” (quoting Buckley 
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam))). 
 219. Id. at 861. 
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protections, the benefits of which manifest over time.220 Citing 
a mid-nineteenth century case, the dissent said, “Congress may 
not ‘withdraw from Article III judicial cognizance any matter 
which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, 
or in equity, or admiralty.’”221  
Nor should consent cure individual or structural 
constitutional concerns, the dissent added, because these 
“interests served by Article III are coextensive.”222 Justice 
Brennan believed a litigant may “[n]ever waive his right to an 
Article III tribunal where one is constitutionally required” and 
because structural and individual constitutional concerns are 
intertwined, consent to an individual violation cannot be 
imputed to a structural violation.223  
Schor was the standard until 2011, when the Court decided 
Stern v. Marshall.224 There, Chief Justice Roberts moved the 
Supreme Court’s legislative court doctrine back to the 
formalistic era of Northern Pipeline.225 The Court addressed the 
issue of whether Article III permits a bankruptcy court to enter 
final judgment on a litigant’s state law counterclaim.226 A 
majority held it did not.227 Like Northern Pipeline, the Court 
rejected the notion that the exercise of Article III power by a 
non-Article III judge does not raise separation of powers 
 
 220. See id. at 863 (“[T]he Court pits an interest the benefits of which are 
immediate, concrete, and easily understood against one, the benefits of which 
are almost entirely prophylactic, and thus often seem remote and not worth 
the cost in any single case.”).  
 221. Id. at 862 (quoting Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 
U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1855)).  
 222. Id. at 867. 
  223.     See id. (arguing party consent is irrelevant to separation of powers 
analysis).  
 224. 564 U.S. 462 (2011). 
 225. See id. at 469 (relying on the tripartite framework from Northern 
Pipeline to hold the bankruptcy judge lacked constitutional authority to 
adjudicate the state law claim).  
 226. See id. at 482 (adding that the bankruptcy judge did have statutory 
jurisdiction).  
 227. See id. (“Although we conclude that § 157(b)(2)(C) permits the 
Bankruptcy Court to enter final judgment on Vickie’s counterclaim, Article III 
of the Constitution does not.”).  
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concerns.228 Here, the bankruptcy judge was impermissibly 
exercising Article III power when it entered final judgment on 
the state law counterclaim.229 This case did not fit into any of 
the three Northern Pipeline exceptions which permit 
congressional delegation of judicial power.230 The Court stated 
that even though district courts appoint and refer cases to 
bankruptcy judges, there was a lack of sufficient supervision 
and control to cleanse the delegation of its separation of powers 
concerns.231  
B.  Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif 
In 2015, the Supreme Court decided Wellness International 
Network, Ltd. v. Sharif.232 In a bankruptcy proceeding, 
Wellness, a creditor of Sharif’s, filed a five-count complaint 
alleging Sharif unlawfully concealed property.233 Count V of the 
complaint sought a declaratory judgment, under state law, that 
the assets held in trust were Sharif’s property subject to the 
bankruptcy estate.234 The district court denied Sharif’s motion 
to file supplemental briefing on whether the bankruptcy court 
was constitutionally able to enter final judgment on the state 
law claim.235 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held the 
bankruptcy court violated separation of powers by adjudicating 
the state law claim.236 
The Supreme Court took up the issue of whether Article III 
permits a bankruptcy judge to adjudicate a state law claim if the 
 
 228. See id. at 486 (rejecting the argument that “the bankruptcy judge was 
acting merely as an adjunct of the district court” (citing N. Pipeline Constr. 
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67–72 (1982))).  
 229. See id. at 487 (rejecting Vickie Lynn Marshall’s assertion that this 
case falls into the “public rights” exception).  
 230. Id.  
 231. See id. at 501 (“[I]t does not matter who appointed the bankruptcy 
judge or authorized the judge to render final judgments in such proceedings. 
The constitutional bar remains.”).  
 232. 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015). 
 233. Id. at 1940. 
 234. Id. at 1941. 
 235. Id.  
 236. Id. at 1941–42. 
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parties consent to jurisdiction.237 Justice Sotomayor, writing for 
the majority, held that no separation of powers violation 
occurred because the litigants consented to the bankruptcy 
judge’s jurisdiction over the state law claim.238 Relying on Schor, 
the Court said that the right to an Article III adjudicator was 
partially “a personal right” and thus “subject to waiver.”239 Still, 
the Court recognized a structural separation of powers 
component that consent cannot cure.240 In the end, however, 
Sharif’s consent waived his personal right to have an Article III 
judge adjudicate his case241 and that consent reduced structural 
separation of powers concerns to a de minimis level.242 This is 
the complete opposite of Justice Brennan’s conclusion in Schor 
that because structural and individual constitutional concerns 
are so interwoven, consent cannot be a factor in whether a 
separation of powers violation occurred.243 
In making this determination, the majority applied the 
Schor factors.244 First, the Court reasoned that because district 
 
 237. Id. at 1939. The Court also looked to whether consent must be 
express. Id. at 1947. In this part of the opinion, the Court determined implied 
consent is enough. See id. at 1948 (“The implied consent standard . . . supplies 
the appropriate rule for adjudications by bankruptcy courts . . . .”). A litigant’s 
consent must still be knowing and voluntary but is sufficient where “the 
litigant or counsel was made aware of the need for consent and the right to 
refuse it, and still voluntarily appeared to try the case.” Id. (internal quotation 
and citation omitted).  
 238. See id. at 1944–45 (“[W]e conclude that allowing bankruptcy litigants 
to waive the right to Article III adjudication of Stern claims does not usurp the 
constitutional prerogatives of Article III courts.”). 
 239. Id. at 1944 (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 
478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986)).  
 240. See infra note 242 and accompanying text.  
 241. See Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1945 n.10 (“Consent provides, if not 
complete, at least very considerable reason to doubt that the tribunal poses a 
serious threat to the ideal of federal adjudicatory independence.” (quoting 
Daniel J. Meltzer, Legislative Courts, Legislative Power, and the Constitution, 
65 IND. L.J. 291, 303 (1990))).  
 242. See id. (reiterating that consent cannot cure a structural violation, if 
one occurs, but can act to mitigate the occurrence of a structural violation).  
 243. See supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
 244. See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1944 
(2015). 
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judges appoint and have the ability to remove bankruptcy 
judges,245 enough supervision and control exists to cleanse the 
delegation of Article III power away from the district court.246 
Additionally, the scope of the bankruptcy judge’s jurisdiction 
was limited.247 That jurisdiction only extends to “a narrow class 
of common law claims as an incident to the bankruptcy courts’ 
primary, and unchallenged, adjudicative function.”248  
The Court did not discuss the second Schor factor, moving 
directly to why Congress expanded bankruptcy judge 
jurisdiction.249 In analyzing this third factor, the Court noted 
that the congressional concerns which drove the legislature to 
expand bankruptcy jurisdiction was not “in an effort to 
aggrandize itself or humble the Judiciary.”250 Congress’ reason 
for expanding bankruptcy judge power was to reduce the burden 
 
The Court must weigh [1] the extent to which the essential 
attributes of judicial power are reserved to Article III courts, and, 
conversely, the extent to which the non-Article III forum exercises 
the range of jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in Article 
III courts, [2] the origins and importance of the right to be 
adjudicated, and [3] the concerns that drove Congress to depart 
from the requirements of Article III. (internal quotation and 
citation omitted). 
 245. See id. at 1945 (describing the mechanisms in place for district court 
supervision and review).  
 246. See id. (“[T]he decision to invoke a non-Article III forum is left entirely 
to the parties and the power of the federal judiciary to take jurisdiction 
remains in place.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)).  
 247. See id. (noting that the bankruptcy courts possess “no free-floating 
authority”).  
 248. Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).  
 249. See id. (moving directly from the discussion of the district court’s 
control to the reasoning behind Congress expanding bankruptcy judge 
jurisdiction).  
 250. See id. (finding no separation of powers danger in allowing 
bankruptcy judges to adjudicate Stern claims with the parties’ consent because 
the control and power remained vested in the district court).  
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on Article III judges.251 In the end, none of the Schor factors 
suggested a separation of powers violation.252 
After applying the Schor factors, the Court returned to 
consent.253 The majority reiterated that “Northern Pipeline 
established only that Congress may not vest in a non-Article III 
court the power to adjudicate, render final judgment, and issue 
binding orders in a traditional contract action arising under 
state law, without consent of the litigants . . . .”254 In each case 
where the Supreme Court found a violation of a separation of 
powers, it involved a party being forced to litigate “involuntarily 
before a non-Article III court.”255 Here, because the parties 
consented, those same concerns were not present, reducing any 
Article III concerns.256  
Chief Justice Roberts dissented, explaining that the 
majority’s conclusion was improper because it confused 
individual constitutional safeguards with structural 
safeguards.257 While a litigant may consent to an Article III 
violation that affects her personal right, she cannot “by consent 
cure the [structural] constitutional difficulty for the same 
reason that the parties by consent cannot confer on federal 
courts subject-matter jurisdiction beyond the limitations 
 
 251. See id. at 1946 (“Congress could choose to rest the full share of the 
Judiciary’s labor on the shoulders of Article III judges . . . . Instead, Congress 
has supplemented the capacity of district courts through the able assistance 
of bankruptcy judges.”). 
 252. See id. (concluding that, taken together, the factors show the district 
court retained its Article III power).  
 253. See id. at 1946–47 (distinguishing Stern and Northern Pipeline 
because in both cases the litigants had not consented to a non-Article III 
adjudicator).  
 254. Id. at 1946 (internal quotation omitted). 
 255. See id. at 1947 (referencing Northern Pipeline and Stern). 
 256. See id. at 1944 (“[The] question must be decided not by ‘formalistic 
and unbending rules,’ but ‘with an eye to the practical effect that the’ practice 
‘will have on the constitutionally assigned role of the federal judiciary.’” 
(quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 587 
(1985))).  
 257. See id. at 1956 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that Schor 
recognized both a personal right to an Article III judge subject to waiver and 
a structural protection to Article III that litigants cannot waive). 
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imposed by Article III.”258 The “structural” protections Chief 
Justice Roberts discuses are those limitations that “serve 
institutional interests”259 —including the protections afforded to 
Article III judges by the Constitution.260 Because of these 
safeguards, “Congress may not confer power to decide federal 
cases and controversies upon judges who do not comply with the 
structural safeguards of Article III.”261 Chief Justice Roberts’ 
view is that litigant consent can never diminish or somehow 
avoid structural safeguards.262  
C.  Constitutional Concerns Addressed by Lower Courts 
While the Supreme Court has not addressed the 
constitutional concerns related to consent jurisdiction and 
§ 2255 proceedings, various circuit courts have. The Fourth 
Circuit in United States v. Bryson263 took up the issue of whether 
magistrate judges can adjudicate § 2255 motions in 
misdemeanor cases.264 There, the magistrate judge who 
adjudicated the § 2255 motion was also the sentencing judge in 
Bryson’s case.265 The court held a magistrate judge can enter 
final judgment in a § 2255 motion under § 636(c) when they are 
the sentencing judge.266 The magistrate judge, however, failed to 
obtain consent from Bryson during the § 2255 proceeding and 
 
 258. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850–51 (1986)).  
 259. See id. (discussing the importance of these protections to the 
Constitution and comparing them to structural safeguards that pertain to the 
legislative and executive branches).  
 260. See id. (reiterating the constitutional protections afforded to Article 
III judges and their importance to a system of separation of powers).  
 261. Id. at 1951. 
 262. See id. at 1959 (“But the fact remains that Congress controls the 
salary and tenure of bankruptcy judges, and the Legislature’s present 
solicitude provides no guarantee of its future restraint.”).  
 263. 981 F.2d 720 (4th Cir. 1992). 
 264. See id. at 723 (“The issue now presented is whether the magistrate 
judge’s jurisdiction over the misdemeanor case included the jurisdiction over 
the § 2255 motion.”). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3401, magistrate judges may conduct 
trials and impose sentences in misdemeanor cases. 18 U.S.C. § 3401.  
 265. Bryson, 981 F.2d at 721–22.  
 266. See id. at 724 (“With the explicit consent to do so, a magistrate judge 
can decide the § 2255 motion on the merits.”).  
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thus the denial of his motion was reversed on appeal.267 The 
court said separation of powers concerns were minimal here 
because the magistrate judge only reviewed his own sentence.268 
This is unlike the situation in the next two cases, where a 
magistrate judge reviewed determinations made by district 
judges in felony cases. 
The Fifth Circuit in Johnston, was first to address 
magistrate judge disposition of § 2255 motions where a district 
judge presided over the original felony trial.269 There, the 
movant alleged that the district court made a procedural error 
in relying on certain testimony to determine his sentence.270 
Both Johnston and the Government consented to proceed before 
a magistrate judge.271 That magistrate denied Johnston’s 
motion, which he appealed.272 The Fifth Circuit addressed the 
issue of whether “the delegation of the duty to a magistrate 
judge offends the principles of Article III.”273  
The court began by noting that consent or waiver by the 
litigants “does not eliminate the constitutional concerns” linked 
to delegating § 2255 proceedings to a magistrate judge.274 
Structural concerns protect an independent judiciary and 
ensure co-equality among the three branches of government.275 
 
 267. See id. (noting that Bryson’s consent was clear for the magistrate to 
sentence him, but not for the magistrate to enter final judgment in his § 2255 
motion). The court also rejected the Government’s argument that consent in 
the initial proceeding could extend to the subsequent § 2255 motion. See id. 
(refusing to expand the definition of “sentencing” under 18 U.S.C. § 3401(b) to 
include § 2255 motions).  
 268. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.  
 269. See United States v. Johnston, 258 F.3d 361, 363 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(raising the issue sua sponte). 
 270. Id. Johnston also argued his conviction was unconstitutional because 
the Government engaged in improper conduct during the trial. Id.  
 271. Id. 
 272. See id. (noting that there was confusion about whether Johnston was 
filing a notice of appeal or moving for a certificate of appealability).  
 273. See id. at 366. (“[W]e must still determine whether delegating those 
[§ 2255] proceedings to magistrate judges comports with the strictures of 
Article III.”). 
 274. Id. at 366–67. 
 275. See id. at 367 (distinguishing between the personal right to have an 
Article III judge preside over a case and the structural principles designed to 
keep Article III power vested in Article III judges).  
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These concerns contrast with individual concerns related to 
having a case heard by an independent Article III judge.276 The 
structural concern implicated here, is a magistrate judge sitting 
in a quasi-appellate capacity reviewing a district judge’s prior 
determination.277 The court explained that run-of-the-mill civil 
cases only require a magistrate to adjudicate issues between the 
parties.278 Section 2255 motions, on the other hand, “do[ ] not 
easily comport with the average civil case or even another 
quasi-civil proceeding” because magistrate judges act more like 
an appellate judge evaluating whether a district judge’s 
sentence was proper.279 
More than just the reviewability issue, other aspects of 
magistrate judges adjudicating § 2255 motions troubled the 
court. First, magistrate judges need not defer to the district 
judge’s prior determinations.280 This allows the supervisee (the 
magistrate judge) to effectively supervise the supervisor (the 
district judge).281 And recognizing the criminal characteristics of 
a § 2255 motion, the court stressed that even if a magistrate 
judge could constitutionally review and modify a civil order or 
misdemeanor sentence by a district judge, they could never 
modify or vacate a sentence imposed in a felony case.282  
Indeed, permitting a magistrate judge to dispose of § 2255 
motions “encroaches upon a district court’s exclusive felony trial 
domain.”283 This is different than in Peretz, where a magistrate 
 
 276. See id. (“[T]he only matter before us is whether the delegation of the 
§ 2255 motion pursuant to § 636(c) offended the structural guarantees of 
Article III.”). 
 277. See id. at 368 (discussing the complexities a § 2255 motion presents 
compared to a run-of-the-mill civil proceeding). 
 278. See id. (minimizing the constitutional impact in ordinary civil cases).  
 279. See id. (referring to magistrate judges reviewing a district judge’s 
determination). 
 280. See id. at 369 (implying that review under § 2255 is de novo).  
 281. See id. (emphasizing that this scheme moots the argument that 
because the district court supervises magistrate judges, the essential 
attributes of judicial power remain vested in Article III). 
 282. See id. (explaining that having a magistrate judge embroiled in a 
felony criminal case is alone an Article III violation).  
 283. Id. at 370. 
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judge supervised voir dire in a felony trial.284 There, the 
Supreme Court permitted the practice because it was ultimately 
left to the district judge’s final determination whether to 
empanel the magistrate judge-selected jury.285  
The final thing troubling the court was the lack of district 
court review and supervision once a magistrate judge enters 
final judgment.286 Section 636(c) treats magistrate judges less 
as adjuncts under the supervision of Article III judges and more 
like they are independent of Article III control.287 This is 
because any appeal would go directly to the court of appeals for 
that circuit. For these reasons, the court held the practice was 
unconstitutional for violating the doctrine of separation of 
powers.288  
The Brown court likewise addressed these constitutional 
concerns, but instead decided that magistrate judges lack 
statutory authority to adjudicate § 2255 motions.289 The court 
began at the founding, noting the importance an independent 
judiciary meant to the survival of the Republic.290 The Framers 
built into the Constitution a system of checks and balances that 
“defines the power and protects the independence of the Judicial 
Branch.”291 The importance of this system is to keep judicial 
 
 284. See Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 937 (1991) (doing so under 
the “additional duties” provision of § 636).  
 285. See id. (holding so because the district court had the final say on 
empaneling the magistrate judge’s selected jury).  
 286. See United States v. Johnston, 258 F.3d 361, 370 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(noting the posture of § 2255 motions turns reviewability on its head). 
 287. See id. (explaining that unlike a district judge reviewing a magistrate 
judge’s determination (like in Peretz), a magistrate judge reviews an Article 
III judge’s rulings). 
 288. See id. at 372 (“[W]e conclude that the consensual delegation of § 2255 
motions to magistrate judges violates Article III of the Constitution.”).  
 289. See Brown v. United States, 748 F.3d 1045, 1068 (11th Cir. 2014) 
(“[W]e hold that a § 2255 proceeding is not a civil matter so as to avoid Article 
III concerns.”). 
 290. See id. at 1069 (describing separation of powers as “essential” in 
framing the Constitution); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 428 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898) (“[Separation of powers ensures an] 
independent spirit in the judges, which must be essential to the faithful 
performance of so arduous a duty.”). 
 291. See Brown, 748 F.3d at 1069 (quoting Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 
482–83 (2011)). 
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power vested in Article III judges.292 When magistrate judges 
enter final judgment in civil matters, they exercise Article III 
power and do not serve as mere adjuncts of the district courts.293 
Moreover, “[t]he fact that the parties consent to a 
magistrate . . . does not . . . obviate the Article III concerns.”294  
Aside from the court’s facial concern with § 636(c), it 
discussed the unique separation of powers implication when 
magistrate judges adjudicate § 2255 motions.295 The court 
objected to the quasi-appellate nature of this review and noted 
the hindrance it has on the district court’s reviewability and 
control.296 With this in mind, the court emphasized the lack of 
supervision by the district courts, noting a hallmark of the 
magistrate judge system is district court review and 
supervision, not magistrate judge independence.297 Because a 
final order by a magistrate judge under consent jurisdiction is 
only reviewable by the circuit court, the district court is stripped 
of its supervision beyond constitutional limits.298 Even though 
the court ultimately declined to rule on the constitutional 
question, the sentiment was clear—magistrate judge 
adjudication of § 2255 motions under § 636(c) is not 
constitutionally permissible.299 
 
 292. See id. (discussing the Supreme Court’s holding in Stern). 
 293. See id. (“Instead, magistrate judges exercise the judicial Power of the 
United States, despite the fact that they lack Article III protections.” (internal 
quotations and citation omitted)).  
 294. Id. at 1070.  
 295. Id. 
 296. See id. at 1070–71 (“It is axiomatic that non-Article III judges may 
not revise or overturn Article III judgments.”).  
 297. See id. at 1071 (relying on the rules for filing appeals of § 636(c) 
judgments for support). 
 298. See id. at 1071–72 (noting the limited appellate review of judgments 
made under § 636(c) jurisdiction). This lack of review reduces the district 
court’s control at the end of the proceeding, divesting the court of its Article 
III control. Id.  
 299. See id. at 1072 (invalidating the practice on statutory grounds).  
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D.  Can Magistrate Judges Constitutionally Dispose of § 2255 
Motions? 
It is important to state that this Note is not suggesting 
§ 636(c) is facially unconstitutional.300 Rather, § 636(c) 
jurisdiction is unconstitutional when used to adjudicate § 2255 
motions.301 Magistrate judge review of § 2255 motions concern 
more than a non-Article III adjudicator exercising Article III 
power.302 Here, a non-Article III judge has the final word on 
whether an Article III judge’s prior determination is correct. 
This situation ignores the characteristics that distinguish 
Article III judges and protects them from encroachment by the 
other branches.303 It also shifts reviewability and supervision 
away from Article III and into the hands of the magistrate 
judge.304  
1.  The Schor Factors Test 
The factors from Schor, as applied by the majority in 
Wellness, show magistrate judge adjudication of § 2255 
proceedings violates separations of power.305 First, Article III 
judges retain very little supervision over the adjudication of 
§ 2255 motions by magistrate judges.306 The only review of a 
magistrate judge’s final order is a discretionary appeal to the 
court of appeals for the circuit in which the district sits.307 Even 
though district courts retain power ex ante to appoint and refer 
§ 2255 motions to magistrates, once a magistrate judge enters a 
 
 300. But see id. at 1068 (“At the outset, we harbor serious concerns as to 
the facial constitutionality of § 636(c).”). 
 301. See United States v. Johnston, 258 F.3d 361, 372 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(holding that the practice violates Article III separation of powers).  
 302. See Brown v. United States, 748 F.3d 1045, 1070 (11th Cir. 2014) 
(noting the unique separation of powers concerns involved).  
 303. See supra note 260 and accompanying text.  
 304. See Johnston, 258 F.3d at 370 (describing how magistrate judges now 
review the district court judge).  
 305. See supra note 244 and accompanying text. 
 306. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.  
 307. See Johnston, 258 F.3d at 370 (discussing the appeal procedure once 
a magistrate judge entered the final order); 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3) (providing 
the same appeal structure as if a district judge enters the final order). 
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final order, the district court lacks all review.308 Ironically, it is 
the magistrate judge who is given the power to review the 
Article III judge,309 turning reviewability on its head and further 
removing the district judge from the proceeding.310 
Second, as discussed,311 the right to post-conviction relief 
under § 2255 is a “fundamental precept to liberty.”312 Because 
habeas corpus is so vital, it cannot be suspended unless it falls 
into a narrow exception and is approved by Congress.313 
Section 2255 became an important way to enforce that right 
while addressing the “practical difficulties that had arisen in 
administering the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal 
courts.”314 The enactment of § 2255 did not alter the remedy 
available to federal prisoners challenging their convictions.315 
Thus, § 2255 has the same level of importance and 
fundamentality as any other habeas statute, counseling against 
delegation of it to non-Article III judges. 
Finally, Congress’ reasons for expanding magistrate judge 
jurisdiction under § 636(c) do not outweigh the significant 
erosion of Article III power. Congress expanded magistrate 
judge jurisdiction to allow litigants increased access to federal 
courts.316 The goal of the Federal Magistrates Act of 1979 was to 
 
 308. See supra note 307 and accompanying text.  
 309. See Johnston, 258 F.3d at 369 (“If the parties to a § 2255 motion 
consent to proceed before a magistrate judge, that magistrate judge could 
attack the validity of an Article III judge’s rulings. Such an act clearly raises 
Article III concerns . . . .”). 
 310. See id. (criticizing situations where a magistrate judge exercises more 
control over the district judge).  
 311. See supra Part II.C. 
 312. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739 (2008) (discussing habeas 
corpus during the framing of the Constitution). 
 313. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas 
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion 
the public Safety may require it.”). 
 314. See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219 (1952) (providing 
background on § 2255).  
 315. See Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 427 (1962) (“[The] remedy 
[under § 2255 is] exactly commensurate with . . . [what] had previously been 
available by habeas corpus in the court of the district where the prisoner was 
confined.”).  
 316. See supra notes 178–179 and accompanying text.  
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protect individuals from the “vicissitudes of adjudication delay 
and expense.”317 This was because of a “mounting queue of civil 
cases” building in the district courts.318 These legislative goals 
are weighed against the infringement on Article III power.319 
Adjudication of § 2255 motions under § 636(c) places a 
non-Article III magistrate judge in a quasi-appellate capacity, 
vesting her with Article III power and stripping the Article III 
court of all review and supervision.320 Judicial efficiency must 
give way when a constitutional infringement is this great.321 
Taken together, the Schor factors suggest delegation of § 2255 
motions to magistrate judges impermissibly infringes on Article 
III power and violates structural separation of powers.  
Besides the Schor factors, final disposition of § 2255 
motions impermissibly involve magistrate judges in felony 
criminal proceedings.322 As the court in Johnston explained, 
felony criminal trials and sentencing are the exclusive domain 
of Article III judges.323 Allowing the adjudication of § 2255 
motions by magistrate judges to continue “may unwittingly 
embroil a magistrate judge in the unconstitutional conduct of a 
felony trial . . . .”324 This situation alone creates a constitutional 
 
 317. See S. REP. NO. 96-74, at 4 (1979), as reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1469, 1472 (explaining the reasoning for expanding magistrate judge 
jurisdiction).  
 318. Id.  
 319. See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1945 
(2015) (comparing the goals of Congress in increasing bankruptcy jurisdiction 
with the constitutional concerns the expansion creates).  
 320. See id. at 1959 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Of course, it ‘goes without 
saying’ that practical considerations of efficiency and convenience cannot 
trump the structural protections of the Constitution.” (citations omitted)). 
 321. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 629 (1952) 
(Douglas, J., concurring) (“The doctrine of the separation of powers was 
adopted by the Convention of 1787 not to promote efficiency but to preclude 
the exercise of arbitrary power.” (citation omitted)). 
 322. See United States v. Johnston, 258 F.3d 361, 370 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(noting that one of the troubling parts of magistrate judge disposition of § 2255 
motions is their involvement in felony trials). But cf. Peretz v. United States, 
501 U.S. 923, 924–25 (1991) (permitting magistrate judges to supervise felony 
trial voir dire).  
 323. See Johnston, 258 F.3d at 370 (discussing the separation of powers 
implications of having a non-Article III judge preside over a felony trial). 
 324. Id. at 369–70.  
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concern.325 And permitting magistrate judges to make 
determinations in felony cases ex post does not diminish the 
interference with Article III.326 In sum, the Schor factors and 
the degree of involvement in felony cases suggest that 
magistrate judge adjudication of § 2255 motions under consent 
jurisdiction violates the doctrine of separation of powers. 
2.  Consent 
Since the Schor factors suggest a violation of the doctrine of 
separation of powers, the question becomes whether consent can 
diminish or cure this violation. In Savoca v. United States,327 the 
district court upheld the constitutionality of magistrate judge 
disposition of § 2255 motions because of party consent.328 Savoca 
and his co-conspirator proceeded pro se, challenging their 
sentences as unconstitutional.329 Savoca separately challenged 
the circumstances of his conviction.330 Both consented to 
jurisdiction under § 636(c).331 In an opinion addressing Savoca’s 
motion to withdraw that consent, District Judge Marrero 
adopted Magistrate Judge Lisa Margaret Smith’s Report and 
Recommendation (R&R).332 
Savoca relied on the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Johnston 
to argue Magistrate Judge Smith’s adjudication of his § 2255 
 
 325. See United Stated v. Dees, 125 F.3d 261, 267 (5th Cir. 1997) (“We 
doubt that Article III will permit a non-Article III judge to preside over a felony 
trial.”).  
 326. See supra note 322 and accompanying text. 
 327. 199 F. Supp. 3d 716 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
 328. See id. at 725 (“[T]he structural protections provided by Article III are 
guaranteed in this instance for all the same reasons they are guaranteed in 
all other instances of referrals pursuant to § 636(c)(1).”). 
 329. See id. at 719 (recognizing their complaints were filed under § 2255).  
 330. Id.  
 331. Id. at 719–20.  
 332. See id. at 719 (denying Savoca’s motion to withdraw consent). 
Magistrate Judge Smith was the magistrate judge that Savoca had consented 
to. Id. It seems odd that a district judge would refer this motion to the same 
magistrate judge, given Savoca’s main argument was that she lacked the 
constitutional authority to adjudicate his § 2255 motion. See id. at 721–22.  
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motion was unconstitutional.333 In her R&R, Magistrate Judge 
Smith said party consent moots all individual separation of 
powers concerns.334 Because Savoca knowingly and voluntarily 
consented,335 no separation of powers concerns were present.336 
Judge Smith compared magistrates adjudicating § 2255 
motions with magistrates adjudicating § 1983 actions.337 In 
making that comparison, her focus was only on separation of 
powers as it pertains to delegation of Article III power to a 
non-Article III judge.338 In fact, she disposed of the true issue 
(having a magistrate judge review and overturn a district 
 
 333. See id. (citing the separation of powers argument advanced by the 
court in Johnston).  
 334. See id. at 722 (stating that litigant may waive their personal right to 
an Article III adjudicator).  
 335. Id. Of relevance is that litigant consent under § 636(c) only needs to 
be implied. Cf. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd., v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1948 
(2015) (permitting implied consent for bankruptcy claims). Like Savoca, many 
§ 2255 litigants are pro se and do not know about the differences or 
implications of having a magistrate judge adjudicate their motion. See Lee 
Kovarsky, Original Habeas Redux, 97 VA. L. REV. 61, 90 (2011) (finding that, 
on average, from 1998 to 2007, only 2.1 percent of non-capital prisoners 
seeking habeas relief had an attorney representing them). This indicates 
implied consent, even for individual constitutional protections, may be 
insufficient in the context of § 2255. See Anderson v. Woodcreek Venture Ltd., 
351 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2003) (“We are similarly troubled by the failure of 
the magistrate judge and district court judge to ‘advise [Anderson] [the pro se 
litigant] that [she was] free to withhold consent without adverse substantive 
consequences.’” (citation omitted)).  
 336. See Savoca, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 723 (finding that so long as the parties’ 
consent and the district court retains supervision over the process, there are 
no structural implications when a magistrate judge adjudicates a § 2255 
motion).  
 337. See id. (citing Collins v. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108, 109–10 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(permitting magistrate judges to enter final judgment in § 1983 actions)). 
What this comparison ignores is that adjudication of a § 1983 action does not 
require a magistrate judge to review and potentially overturn an Article III 
judge’s prior determination. See supra note 279 and accompanying text. 
 338. See Savoca v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 3d 716, 723 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) 
(applying the Collins decision in the context of an “Article III ban on the 
delegation of judicial power to non-Article III judges”).  
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judge’s prior determination) by saying even if the practice is 
“awkward or ill-advised,” it does not violate the Constitution.339  
The R&R concluded that even if structural separation of 
powers concerns exist, Savoca’s consent along with the district 
court’s delegation and supervision, cure any defect.340 Concern 
over the lack of reviewability was mitigated because appeals are 
brought to an Article III appellate court.341 Thus, there was still 
review by an Article III judge.342 What this argument fails to 
acknowledge is circuit review is discretionary, not mandatory.343 
And shifting the reviewability burden to circuit courts does little 
for judicial efficiency, the primary goal of increased magistrate 
judge jurisdiction.344 In the end, Savoca held the complete 
opposite of Johnston and failed to address the statutory issue 
resolved in Brown. What it does show is how consent affects 
constitutional implications when magistrates adjudicate § 2255 
motions under consent jurisdiction.345  
The majority and dissent in Wellness agree parties can 
never fully consent to structural separation of powers 
 
 339. See id. at 724 n.12 (internal quotations and citation omitted) (noting 
that the situation did not present itself here because the original sentencing 
judge had retired from the bench before Magistrate Judge Smith decided the 
§ 2255 motion).  
 340. See id. at 723 (interpreting the Wellness majority as permitting 
consent to cure all separation of powers concerns if there is some supervisory 
authority by Article III).  
 341. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3) (detailing the appeal process from a 
magistrate judge’s final order).  
 342. See Savoca, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 725 (“There is no principled reason to 
believe this method [circuit court review] is unconstitutional as applied to 
§ 2255 motions but not as applied to other ‘civil matters.’”).  
 343. See supra note 307 and accompanying text.  
 344. See S. REP. NO. 96-74, at 3 (1979), as reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1469, 1470–72 (discussing how the purpose of § 636(c) was to reduce the 
“mounting queue of civil cases” in the district courts). The reviewability 
Magistrate Judge Smith suggests would shift that queue to the circuit courts, 
or altogether ignore it, which would provide reviewability only in theory. See 
Savoca, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 723 (arguing that the practice is constitutional 
because Article III still has some review mechanism).  
 345. See Savoca, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 723 (relying on Wellness consent to 
cure any constitutional defects). 
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violations.346 Still, the majority acknowledges that party 
consent can diminish a structural violation.347 The dissent, on 
the other hand, reminded the majority that when the executive 
and legislative branches consented to bypassing bicameralism 
and presentment with the line-item veto, the Court invalidated 
the Act.348 Similarly, the one-house legislative veto was struck 
down, despite both branches consenting.349 Thus, party consent 
does not affect whether a structural violation occurred.350  
Despite the Court’s statement in Wellness that party 
consent can diminish separation of powers concerns, consent is 
unlikely to cure the constitutional violations present when 
magistrate judges adjudicate § 2255 motions. Having 
magistrates review and overturn district judge-imposed 
sentences is a more significant constitutional violation than 
bankruptcy judges adjudicating a state law claim. In the context 
of § 2255 motions and consent jurisdiction, district judges retain 
far less supervision over magistrate judges and Article III power 
is further removed from the district courts. This means even if 
consent has some effect on structural separation of powers 
concerns, the magnitude of the violation here is too great for 
consent to cleanse it.  
 
 346. See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1945 n.10 
(2015) (majority opinion) (stating that Sharif’s consent is not curing a 
structural violation, rather his consent “shows . . . why no such violation has 
occurred”); id. at 1956 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (explaining that just as 
consent cannot confer subject-matter jurisdiction on a federal court, consent 
cannot usurp structural principles of separation of powers); Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850–51 (1986) (establishing 
the rule). 
 347. See supra note 242 and accompanying text. 
 348. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1988) 
(invalidating the Line-Item Veto Act for violating structural separation of 
powers principles). 
 349. See I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944–45 (1983) (striking down 
Section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act for violating 
separation of powers doctrine).  
 350. See Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1955 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (reminding 
the majority “separation of powers does not depend on . . . whether the 
encroached-upon branch approves the encroachment” (internal quotations and 
citations omitted)).  
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V.  Avoiding Statutory and Constitutional Concerns Going 
Forward 
Given that magistrate judge jurisdiction has gone 
unchanged since 1979, amending § 636(c) to exclude § 2255 
proceedings is unlikely.351 The more probable scenario is the 
Supreme Court granting certiorari in a case involving a 
challenge to magistrate judge authority to enter final judgment 
in a § 2255 proceeding. If this happens, the Court should find 
the practice statutorily and constitutionally impermissible for 
the reasons previously stated.352 The ideal solution, once the 
court limits jurisdiction over § 2255 motions, would be to limit 
magistrate judge involvement in these proceedings to issuing 
report and recommendations.353 Other proposed solutions are 
discussed in Part V.A. 
A.  Proposed Solutions 
There are several possibilities for solving the problem of 
magistrate judge adjudication of § 2255 motions under § 636(c). 
One of the more radical solutions is to amend the Constitution 
to permit magistrate judges to exercise Article III power. 354 This 
would provide them with the constitutional protections afforded 
to Article III judges and alleviate concern over the authority of 
magistrate judges to enter final judgment in § 2255 
proceedings.355 That said, given the difficult amendment 
 
 351. See Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-82, 93 Stat. 643 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 636) (providing the last substantive 
change by Congress to magistrate judge jurisdiction).  
 352. See supra Parts III.B, IV.D. 
 353. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (permitting a district judge to have a 
magistrate “submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and 
recommendations for . . . disposition”). 
 354. See Benjamin P.D. Mejia, Note, Magistrates After Arkison & 
Wellness: The Outer Limits of Consent, 71 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 509, 
549– 50 (2016) (providing proposed amendment language). Mejia suggests 
language such as “Congress may establish procedures by which Article III 
judges may appoint Article I judges . . . subject to the control of Article III 
courts, may exercise Article III judicial power.” Id.  
 355. See id. (including life tenure and protection from salary diminution). 
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process, this solution is unrealistic and would take too long to 
implement.356 
Another solution is to make all magistrate judges district 
judges. This would alleviate any concern over magistrate judges 
wielding Article III power since they would now be Article III 
judges.357 Like the amendment solution, it would be difficult to 
formally appoint and confirm all currently serving magistrate 
judges.358 With the backlog of current judicial appointments,359 
adding appointees may cause chaos in an already uneconomical 
and partisan process.360 In the end, this solution will only 
increase inefficiency and create a “mounting queue” of § 2255 
motions in the district courts while Congress resolves the 
issue.361 The pitfalls of these potential solutions show the best 
way to allow magistrate judges to constitutionally be involved 
in § 2255 proceedings is to limit them to issuing R&Rs.  
B.  Best Approach: Report and Recommendations 
Limiting magistrate judges to issuing R&Rs in § 2255 
proceedings preserves the rights of mostly pro se litigants, 
maintains separation of powers, and ensures judicial efficiency. 
District judges review R&Rs de novo,362 allowing an Article III 
 
 356. See Jonathan L. Marshfield, The Amendment Effect, 98 B.U. L. REV. 
55, 58 (2018) (discussing the difficult process of amending the Constitution).  
 357. See United States v. Johnston, 258 F.3d 361, 367 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(noting that to comply with separation of powers principles the essential 
attributes of judicial power must remain with Article III judges).  
 358. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (prescribing appointment and confirmation 
process).  
 359. See Riley T. Svikhart, “Major Questions” as Major Opportunities, 92 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1873, 1891 (2018) (discussing the backlog of President 
Trump’s judicial nominations).  
 360. See Carl Tobias, Filling the Judicial Vacancies in a Presidential 
Election Year, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 985, 988 (2012) (describing the “partisan 
divisiveness” involved in judicial nominations).  
 361. See S. REP. NO. 96-74, at 3 (1979), as reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1469, 1470–72 (discussing the purpose behind increasing magistrate judge 
jurisdiction). 
 362. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) 
A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those 
portions of the report or specific proposed findings or 
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judge to supervise and review the magistrate judge. R&Rs also 
reduce the time a district judge must devote to a case and 
provides for efficient disposition of § 2255 petitions, consistent 
with Congress’ goals when enacting § 636(c).363 Many district 
courts already limit magistrate judge involvement in § 2255 
proceedings to issuing R&Rs and have suffered no backlog of 
§ 2255 motions.364 Indeed, the Magistrate Judge Committee 
prefers that magistrates issue R&Rs in § 2255 proceedings, 
rather than adjudicate the motions under § 636(c).365  
If § 2255 motions are classified as criminal proceedings, 
R&Rs under § 636(b)(1)(B) can provide an efficient and 
constitutional way to delegate § 2255 motions to magistrate 
judges without impermissibly involving them in felony trials 
and sentencing.366 In short, limiting magistrate judges to 
issuing R&Rs in § 2255 motions allows Article III judges to 
retain reviewability and supervision without overburdening the 
district courts and creating judicial inefficiency. 
 
recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court 
may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 
recommendations made the magistrate judge. 
 363. See Mejia, supra note 354, at 542 (proposing limiting § 636 
jurisdiction to R&Rs because it keeps with Congress’ goal of judicial 
efficiency); Robbins, supra note 12, at VI.2 (suggesting R&Rs as a solution 
because they are only a minor alteration from § 636(c) adjudication).  
 364. See Robbins, supra note 12, at VI.2 (noting that many district courts 
already exclusively use R&Rs for § 2255 motions and other jurisdictions would 
be unaffected by limiting magistrate judges in this area).  
 365. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.  
 366. See § 636(b)(1)(B) 
[A] [district] judge may also designate a magistrate judge to conduct 
hearings . . . to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of 
facts and recommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the 
court, of any motion . . . made by individuals convicted of criminal 
offenses and of prisoner petitions challenging conditions of 
confinement. 
Hauser.PostBlueline.docx (Do Not Delete) 1/15/2021  5:01 PM 
2012 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1959 (2020) 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
As § 2255 motions continue to be filed at commensurate 
levels year-over-year,367 the need for the Supreme Court to give 
a definite answer on the scope of magistrate judge jurisdiction 
is imperative. By clarifying whether § 636(c) statutorily and 
constitutionally allows adjudication of § 2255 motions, the 
Supreme Court will provide district courts with guidance on 
how to continue to use magistrate judges. Should the Supreme 
Court invalidate the practice, Congress or the courts should 
limit magistrate judge involvement in § 2255 proceedings to 




 367. Compare ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY, tbl.C-2 (2019), https://perma.cc/PXH8-KY2S (showing 
5,335 § 2255 motions were filed in district courts between June 30, 2018 and 
June 30, 2019), with ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY, tbl.4.4 (2018), https://perma.cc/W33W-JPVF (PDF) 
(reporting that 5,342 § 2255 motions were filed in district courts for fiscal year 
2018). 
